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During the McCarthy era, Congress passed an obscure law authorizing
detained immigrants to work for a payment of one dollar a day. The government
justified the provision, which was modeled after the 1949 Geneva Convention’s
protections for prisoners of war, in the context of the period’s relative heightened
detentions of noncitizens. Soon afterwards, the enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 diminished the use of detention drastically, and the
practice of detainee labor lay dormant for decades.
Modern changes to immigration law and its systems have rendered
immigration detention today the largest mass incarceration movement in U.S.
history. The use, and in some cases abuse, of detainee labor is one of the
symptoms of an epidemic involving the growing influence of the criminal justice
system and prison industry on immigration enforcement. This Article uncovers
the historic origins of paid detainee labor, and then situates the practice within a
contemporary immigration system that includes for-profit corporations and
increasingly punitive characteristics. It examines the legal and policy distinctions
between criminal incarceration and immigration detention. In doing so, it
describes how detainee labor, particularly in cases when the work is forced, is a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Article concludes by offering additional specific and systemic
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recommendations, with the overarching objective of scaling back on the
immigration detention system’s trend of operating more like a penal than civil
institution.
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INTRODUCTION
During the spring of 2014, Hassall Moses was detained at the Northwest
Detention Center, a 1575-bed immigration detention facility owned by The
GEO Group, Inc. (GEO),1 a for-profit prison company. A sprawling campuslike structure built in Tacoma, Washington “on a badly contaminated
Superfund site,” 2 the Northwest Detention Center is one of the largest
immigration detention facilities in the country. During Moses’s detention, the
facility made headlines when about 700 of the detainees engaged in a hunger

1. Northwest
Detention
Center,
GEO
GRP.,
INC.,
http://www.geogroup.com/maps/locationdetails/52 (last visited Aug. 16, 2014). GEO was
established in 1983 as a division of the Wackenhut Corporation, and changed its name in
2003 from the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation to The GEO Group, Inc. History, GEO
GRP., INC., http://geogroup.com/history (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
2. Max Blumenthal, Why Immigrant Detainees Are Turning to Civil Disobedience,
NATION (May 23, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/179987/why-immigrantdetainees-are-turning-civil-disobedience#.
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strike protesting the conditions of their confinement.3 The detainees’ demands
included adequate medical care, an end to indefinite waits for their court
hearings, and better-quality food.4
The Northwest Detention Center personnel allegedly retaliated by placing a
number of the hunger-striker detainees in solitary confinement, among other
ways.5 One of these detainees was Moses, who claimed that he was put in
solitary for “encouraging others to participate” in the strike, including by
calling for a “no working strike.”6 The latter implicated the work conducted by
detainees inside the facility—labor under the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) “Voluntary Work Program” (VWP) that, as Moses described,
rendered detainees “the backbone of [the] detention center.” 7 The demand
associated with the work strike was an increase in pay because, in Moses’s
words, it “is a modern-day slavery that we [detainees] are working for a dollar
a day.”8
The Northwest Detention Center strike is part of a broader context
involving a bloated detention system within an immigration structure that is in
crisis. Detaining immigrants is now the “largest mass incarceration movement
in U.S. history.”9 Since 2009, Congress has ensured that more than 33,000
noncitizens are detained on average each day, 10 resulting in approximately
400,000 immigrants in the detention system a year. Those who are detained are

3 . Dan Berger & Angélica Cházaro, Guest: What’s Behind the Hunger Strike at
Northwest Detention Center, SEATTLE TIMES, (Mar. 19, 2014, 5:08 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2023173231_danbergerangelicachazaroopedprisonhung
erstrike20xml.html.
4. Berger & Cházaro, supra note 3; Blumenthal, supra note 2.
5. See Berger & Cházaro, supra note 3.
6. Interview with Hassall Moses (audio transcript on file with the author).
7. Id.
8. Id.; see also Berger & Cházaro, supra note 3.
9 . Melissa Harris Perry: Working in America for $1 a Day (MSNBC television
broadcast June 1, 2014), available at http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harrisperry/watch/working-in-america-for-1-a-day-271647299870; see also DORA SCHRIRO,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 2 (2009), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf (finding that “ICE
operates the largest detention and supervised release program in the country”). In Fiscal Year
2014, Congress allocated nearly $3 billion in funding for immigration detention programs.
Complaint at 14, Det. Watch Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 14CV-00583 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2014).
10. This per-day detention average is the result of a Congressional mandate first passed
in 2008 subjecting DHS to what has been referred to as a “bed quota.” See infra Part I.B.
Some question, however, whether this funding allocation constitutes a mandate. For
example, the Freedom of Information Act lawsuit on the subject filed by Detention Watch
Network seeks, inter alia, DHS’s reasoning for interpreting the mandate as a law
enforcement quota and not a funding earmark. Complaint, supra note 9, at 11. On July 3,
2014, the Southern District of New York ordered DHS to produce the requested documents
on a monthly basis. Detention Watch Network (DWN) v. Immigration Customs &
Enforcement (ICE), CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://www.ccrjustice.org/bed-quota-foia.
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amongst the noncitizens the government has placed in removal proceedings,
including lawful permanent residents, asylum seekers, and those with “status
violations”—individuals who are undocumented because they entered without
inspection or overstayed their visa.11 Many who are detained are subject to
mandatory detention, 12 which means there is little to no discretionary
determination of whether they should be locked up.13 Unlike prison sentences
in the criminal context, immigration detention is inherently indeterminate, and
due in part to the extensive backlogs in the immigration court system,14 the

11. Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 13 (2009) (“The people in our immigration detention
are not just the newly arrived or the ‘criminal offender.’ In fact, a large number of the
detained are either long term permanent residents or those who are pursuing a claim for
protection from persecution or torture.”); see PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE
UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRANT
POPULATION
(May
22,
2006),
available
at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf (“Nearly half of all the unauthorized migrants
now living in the United States entered the country legally through a port of entry such as an
airport or a border crossing point where they were subject to inspection by immigration
officials.”); The Ones They Leave Behind: Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents
Harms U.S. Citizen Children, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/ones-they-leave-behind-deportation-lawfulpermanent-residents-harm-us-citizen-children. Ten percent of noncitizens deported by the
government each year are Legal Permanent Residents. Keegan Hamilton, Asylum Insanity:
Welcome to the Land of the Free, VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2014/04/asylum_insanity_welcome_to_the_land_
of_the_free.php?page=all.
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2013) (requiring certain categories of immigrants to be
detained during removal proceedings). According to a report issued by ICE in 2009, sixtysix percent of detainees are considered subject to mandatory detention. SCHRIRO, supra note
9, at 6.
13. Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immigration
and Imprisonment in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 438 (2011) (“Unlike
many prisoners, non-U.S. citizens detained by ICE are practically denied the chance at
judicial review of their detention.”). Individuals subject to mandatory detention may request
a Joseph hearing, but this option is riddled with procedural defects. See infra Part I.B.
Congress over the past several decades has vastly broadened what renders an immigrant
subject to mandatory detention, predominantly by expanding the definition of what
constitutes an “aggravated felony.” Nina Bernstein, How One Marijuana Cigarette May
Lead
to
Deportation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
30,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/nyregion/31drug.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
Steve
Patrick Ercolani, Why Are Immigrants Being Deported for Minor Crimes?, ATLANTIC (Nov.
20, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/11/why-are-immigrants-beingdeported-for-minor-crimes/281622/.
14. Ana Campoy, Clogged Immigration Courts Slow Hearings, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11,
2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/clogged-immigration-courts-slow-hearings1407800048; Suzy Khimm, Many Immigrants Facing Deportation Must Wait 550 Days for
Their
Day
in
Court,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
22,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/22/many-immigrants-facingdeportation-must-wait-550-days-for-their-day-in-court/; Dara Lind, How the Government
Became the Single Biggest Employer of Unauthorized Immigrants, VOX (May 26, 2014),
http://www.vox.com/2014/5/26/5752392/how-the-government-became-the-single-biggestemployer-of-unauthorized.
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average time some noncitizens remain in detention has gotten longer.15
A key difference from criminal incarceration is that immigration detention
was not conceived to be punitive, and despite its present scope and institutional
design, 16 immigration detention remains a civil, regulatory scheme. The
justification for detention is to ensure that noncitizens do not abscond prior to
their hearings, or in cases when they have been ordered to be deported, prior to
their removal from the United States.17 The fact that immigration detention is
not punishment exempts the system from many rights afforded in the criminal
context, including the right to counsel.18 It also raises the question of whether
immigration detainee labor is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude, particularly in cases when
detainees allege that the work is forced.
Congress authorized the use of voluntary paid detainee labor over six
decades ago, two years before federal immigration law was first codified in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).19 The law merits scrutiny in today’s
context of mass incarceration of immigrants, where the voluntary nature of the
work detainees perform is dubious, both in certain specific incidents of alleged
forced labor and also, arguably, because of the for-profit motive behind today’s
VWP. The number of individuals who have gone through the immigration
detention system within a given year has more than doubled, from 204,459 in
2001 to 478,000 in 2012.20 With this expansion, immigration detention has
become a very lucrative business—almost half of the facilities are owned or
operated by for-profit corporations, 21 with the Corrections Corporation of
15. There are considerable differences in lengths of detainees’ incarceration based on
factors ranging from in which state they are detained, to whether they are contesting their
removal. Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRACIMMIGRATION (June 3,
2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/321.
16. See generally Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and
Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2013) (describing how the legal
institutions and administrative rules governing immigration detention, including an
overreliance on mandatory detention and burden-shifting schemes, frustrate the purpose of
detention as a tool for immigration enforcement).
17. But see BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS 104-15 (2006) (detailing how
detention is largely unnecessary to achieve these goals, and that alternatives to detention
such as ankle bracelet monitoring essentially accomplish the same results).
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See infra Part III.A. This provision was codified separately under Title 8 of the
U.S. Code after the creation of the INA as 8 U.S.C. §1555(d).
20. Complaint, supra note 9, at 9.
21. Chris Kirkham, Private Prisons Profit from Immigration Crackdown, Federal and
Local Law Enforcement Partnerships, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/private-prisons-immigration-federal-lawenforcement_n_1569219.html. I will predominantly use “for-profit” instead of “private” to
designate corporate involvement in immigration detention facilities because, as was pointed
out to me by an advocate working on these issues, “private” is often mistaken for better
conditions, e.g. a private school. “For-profit,” on the other hand, is more explicit as far as the
structural and operational motivations for an entity’s control over a detention facility.
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America (CCA)22 and GEO as the two largest companies in the immigration
detention business. 23 Detainee labor plays a significant role in how these
corporations maximize their profits:
[In 2013], at least 60,000 immigrants worked in the federal government’s
nationwide patchwork of detention centers—more than worked for any other
single employer in the country . . . . The cheap labor, 13 cents an hour, saves
the government and the private companies $40 million or more a year by
allowing them to avoid paying outside contractors the $7.25 federal minimum
wage.24

This Article questions the legality of paid detainee labor as it operates
today. The use, and in some cases abuse, of detainee labor is one of the myriad
symptoms of an epidemic involving the growing influence of the criminal
justice system and prison industry on immigration enforcement. The
immigration detention system is a civil system, although as this Article will
discuss, it has taken a significant punitive turn. As such, immigrants are
increasingly treated like criminals, even as the two statuses remain distinct.
Prison labor in the criminal justice system has been deemed constitutional,
specifically on account of the Exception Clause contained in the Thirteenth
Amendment.25 With the increasing overlap between the criminal justice and
immigration systems, importing yet another element, this time custodial labor,
from the criminal into the immigration context easily could go unnoticed. I
argue that it should not.
The Article’s title is a reference to Douglas Blackmon’s Pulitzer Prizewinning book, Slavery by Another Name,26 to emphasize how detainee labor
fits into structural forces—in particular, American capitalism and the legal
system—that drive the way in which exploitable labor is and has been
constructed in the United States. In doing so, however, I recognize the
significant difference in severity between the brutal discrimination,
criminalization, and state-sponsored harm inflicted upon African Americans
post-Emancipation, and the subject matter of detainee labor which is the focus
22. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 10 (“CCA earned $752 million in federal contracts
in 2012.”).
23. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Private Prison Companies Continue
Thriving Off Immigration Imprisonment, CRIMMIGRATION (Sept. 18, 2014 4:00 AM),
http://crimmigration.com/2014/09/18/private-prison-companies-continue-thriving-offimmigration-imprisonment-2; see also William Selway and Margaret Newkirk, Congress
Mandates Jail Beds for 34,000 Immigrants as Private Prisons Profit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23,
2013 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-24/congress-fuels-private-jailsdetaining-34-000-immigrants.html.
24. Ian Urbina, Using Jailed Migrants as a Pool of Cheap Labor: Detainees Resist a
U.S. Program that Puts Them to Work for $1 a Day or Less, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/using-jailed-migrants-as-a-pool-of-cheaplabor.html?_r=1.
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).
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of this Article. Drawing the comparisons between the systematic treatment of
African Americans and immigrant detainees, however, reveals critical themes
surrounding fairness and justice today, including the tolerance of legal
discrimination against certain communities of color, and what Michelle
Alexander names as the racial dimension of mass incarceration and the
reconfiguration of a racial caste in this country.27 This Article will touch upon
these themes implicitly and at times expressly, although exploring thoroughly
the important intersectionalities between immigrants, poverty, people of color,
prisoners, and low-wage work is beyond its scope.
Part I provides a historical, legal, and policy overview of the immigration
detention system. It discusses the well-settled construction of immigration
enforcement, including detention, as a civil system. Part I also examines how
modern reforms to U.S. immigration law and infrastructure have created an
almost unquestioning criminalization of noncitizens, including their mass
incarceration, which has been a significant boon to for-profit companies. Part II
focuses on the practice of voluntary paid detainee labor. It details its legislative
history, outlines modern analyses and the operation of the Voluntary Work
Program, and discusses the range of reported problems associated with the
practice.
Part III presents how detainee labor, especially in cases when it is allegedly
forced, is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection against slavery
and involuntary servitude. In doing so, this Part examines the difference
between custodial labor in the criminal justice and immigration settings,
specifically by discussing the exception clause of the Thirteenth Amendment
and the treatment of prison labor in the pretrial context. Finally, the Conclusion
offers an array of additional recommendations aimed at improving the practice
of paid detainee labor, with a focus on both specific and systemic changes.
I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION, PUNISHMENT, AND PROFIT
The objectives and use of immigration detention in the United States have
changed dramatically in the past three decades. The present-day scale and
structure of the system is virtually unrecognizable when compared to the
manner in which it operated from its inception until the 1990s. Modern
legislative and policy reforms have rendered immigration detention today to
appear and function more like the criminal justice system than one that is still
civil in nature. This transformation puts into question the relationship between
detention’s rationale and its function today. Modern reforms to the immigration
system also have heralded an era of mass incarceration of noncitizens, with forprofit corporations making a lucrative business out of detaining immigrants.

27. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).

THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
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A. The Legal and Policy Construction of Immigration Detention as a Civil
Scheme
The first federal immigration law that applied generally to noncitizens was
the Immigration Act of 1882. 28 The Act’s intent echoed those of state
immigration laws that governed migration up until this point,29 namely to keep
out those deemed to be undesirable, including prohibiting “the landing of
paupers and criminals and provid[ing] for the deportation of criminals who
escaped exclusion at the time of arrival.”30
But the 1882 Immigration Act did not mention, let alone authorize,
detention,31 and it was almost another decade before Congress created federal
immigration detention power.32
A legislative review body known as the Ford Committee, tasked to
investigate the operation of the 1882 Act, first raised the issue of federal
detention power.33 Amongst its findings was the practical problem of inspecting
thousands of immigrants per day without the ability to detain at least a portion
of the incoming flow.34 In response, Congress in 1891 passed the first statute
authorizing immigration detention at the federal level—the same year it created
the federal prison system. 35 The intent of creating a federal immigration
detention power was not “to restrict immigration, but to sift it, to separate the
desirable from the undesirable immigrants.”36 In other words, the purpose of
28. Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal
Government, and the Formation of American Immigration Policy, J. AM. HIST. 1092, 1093
(2013). The first Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted in the same year. Under the
Immigration Act of 1882, immigration regulation and enforcement was a matter of state law.
The exception was a set of federal statutes passed in 1798 that restricted the rights of citizens
and non-citizens to criticize the government, or to take acts that might organize opposition to
the federal government. Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1881 (1993) (“[T]he federal government briefly
entered the alien regulation business in 1798. The package of legislation known to history as
the Alien and Sedition Acts included three statutes directed specifically at aliens: the
Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Alien (or Alien Friends) Act.”).
29 . The federal law was modeled after the immigration laws of New York and
Massachusetts in particular. Hirota, supra note 28, at 1095.
30. Hirota, supra note 28, at 1093. The enactment of a general federal immigration
law, however, did not signal exclusive federal control over migratory matters—the
administration of immigration enforcement during the 1880s was carried out as a joint statefederal schema. Id. at 1094.
31. DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 11 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id.
35. See James Houston, Shifting the Paradigm: Classification and Programs in Prison,
20 CRIM. JUST. REV. 66, 68 (1995); Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public
Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth
Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 1023 (2009).
36. WILSHER, supra note 31, at 12 (quoting WILLIAM D. OWEN, REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, H.R. REP. NO. 51-3472, at II-III (1891))
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detention was to facilitate processing.37 During this era, if the government
initiated deportation proceedings after admission, it was “not as an exercise of
social control over individuals long resident in the United States, but as an
extension of the power to admit (or refuse admission to) arriving aliens.”38
Soon after Congress created the federal immigration detention system, the
Supreme Court established, in two seminal opinions, that both deportation and
detention are civil in nature. In 1893, the Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States held that “deportation is not a punishment for crime.”39 A few years
later, in Wong Wing v. United States, the Court characterized detention’s
function as linked to the government’s immigration enforcement power, and in
doing so rejected the imposition of immigration detention as punishment.40 The
Court in Wong Wing examined the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1892,41 which enhanced the ban against most Chinese citizens and
descendants from entering the United States by imposing a sentence of hard
labor for violating the prohibition.42 The Court upheld Congress’s power to

(internal quotation marks omitted). Detention was also acknowledged as a mechanism that
could be beneficial from the vantage of immigrants, namely by providing “a period for
migrants to send for financial or other help from relatives or community groups.” Id. at 13.
37. Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 39 QUEENS L.J.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 51) (on file with author) (“Originally, the United States
put the onus to detain and deport rejected noncitizens on the shipping companies that
transported them, resulting in a brief detention that closely related to deportation. The
shipping companies and immigration officials had little incentive to prolong the process.”).
38 . Teresa A. Miller, Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost: Immigration Enforcement’s
Failed Experiment with Penal Severity, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 220 (2010). Between
1892 and 1907, only a few hundred non-citizens were deported.
Between 1908 and 1920, an average of two or three thousand non-citizens were removed
each year, most of those people were removed from “asylums, hospitals and jails.” Those
who entered unlawfully but managed to avoid early detection soon found safe harbor, since
the law included a one-year statute of limitations on deportation.

Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1836 (2007) (quoting MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 59 (2004)). This varies
greatly from the practice today, where the government can deport any noncitizen, including
long-term lawful permanent residents. See Ercolani, supra note 13.
39. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
40. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235-37 (1896).
41. The Chinese Exclusion Act, first enacted in 1882, imposed a ten-year ban on the
migration of Chinese laborers into the United States, placed restrictions on Chinese workers
already in the country, and denied Chinese migrants the ability to apply for citizenship.
Ernesto Hernández-López, Global Migrations and Imagined Citizenship: Examples from
Slavery, Chinese Exclusion, and when Questioning Birthright Citizenship, 14 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 255, 267, 269 (2008). Congress renewed the Act in 1892 with the
passage of the Geary Act, see James W. Gordon, “Was the First Justice Harlan AntiChinese?”, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 287, 292-93 (2014), which included the provision at
issue before the Supreme Court in Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235-37.
42. Section 4 of the Act provided that “any such Chinese person or person of Chinese
descent, convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United
States, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter
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exclude and expel aliens and characterized detention “as part of the means
necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of
aliens.”43 But it held that the imposition of hard labor constitutes a criminal
penalty that goes beyond the government’s immigration power,44 and thus held
that the Act violated the Constitution’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.45
Since this early era in American immigration law history, deportation, and
by extension detention, has been consistently characterized as a civil,
regulatory matter.46 In fact, as Stephen Legomsky has put it, “[i]f there has been
any constant in U.S. immigration law, it is the insistence of the courts that
deportation is not punishment.”47 That being said, immigration law is unique in
its enforcement of a civil system through physical confinement.48 Its function is
essentially preventive,49 namely to prevent noncitizens in removal proceedings

removed from the United States.” Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 233-34 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43. Id. at 235; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (characterizing
detention as “necessarily a part” of the deportation process).
44. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1457, 1464.
45. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of [C]ongress to protect, by summary
methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable
as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their way into our land, and
unlawfully remain therein. But to declare unlawful residence within the country to be an
infamous crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty and property, would be to pass out of
the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless provision were made that the fact of guilt
should first be established by a judicial trial.

Id. at 237.
46. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 511-12 (2007).
47. Id. at 511 (stating further that “no court has ever deviated from this principle,” but
noting which held that deportation could be punishment in certain instances (citing Lieggi v.
INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1975))); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the
Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 290 (2008) (“Before Fong Yue Ting,
this civil designation [of removal proceedings], now taken for granted, was the subject of
considerable debate. Since its initial pronouncement in these early cases, the Supreme Court
has, despite frequent criticism, relied on the principle of stare decisis and repeatedly refused
to revisit the issue of whether removal proceedings are civil or criminal in nature.”).
48. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 3); see also Benson, supra note 11, at 17
(“Why is detention permissible in immigration law, as opposed to other important areas of
civil law enforcement, whether it be tax collection or environmental protection? In a nation
that abolished federal debtor’s prisons in 1835, why does the status of an individual’s
citizenship allow a civil detention and restriction of individual liberty without individualized
decision making?”). Some have compared immigration detention to civil commitment
generally to argue that immigration detention should have higher substantive standards and
procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on
Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 377-79 (2014).
49. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 17).
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or with a final order of removal from absconding.50 Noncitizens may be placed
in immigration detention after the government charges them with an
immigration violation through a document known as a Notice to Appear.51 But,
it is important to note that if the alleged violation is based on criminal conduct,
the noncitizen first goes through the criminal justice system, including, if
appropriate, serving time in prison or jail.52
The next Subpart details modern legal and policy changes that have led to a
significantly heightened punitive immigration system. It is important to
emphasize that despite these changes, the immigration system, including
detention, remains distinct from the criminal justice system. This difference,
established from virtually the beginning of federal immigration power, is why
there are still “important reasons to consider [the rights of] those held purely
under immigration powers separately from those convicted of criminal
offenses.”53 In many important ways, the immigration system is built on this
distinction. For example, noncitizens facing charges of an immigration
violation, even the most vulnerable, such as children and those with mental
disabilities, do not have a right to an attorney.54 The health care provided in
50. See id. Studies have found, however, that the government can achieve the same
objective with comparable success and much less cost through alternatives to detention. See,
e.g., OREN ROOT, VERA INST., THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
DETENTION FOR NONCITIZENS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 5 (2000)
(finding, inter alia, that ninety-one percent of immigrants not detained attended all their
immigration hearings).
51. New Practice Advisory Regarding Notices to Appear, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL
(June 30, 2014), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/newsroom/release/newpractice-advisory-regarding-notices-appear. There have been incidents where the
government mistakenly has placed U.S. citizens in deportation proceedings and detention as
well. See, e.g., William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine: A Citizen Trapped in the
System,
NEW
YORKER,
Apr.
29,
2013,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/the-deportation-machine; Ted Robbins, In
the Rush to Deport, Expelling U.S. Citizens, NPR (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141500145/in-the-rush-to-deport-expelling-u-s-citizens;
Jacqueline Stevens, Deporting American Citizens: ICE’s Mexican-izing of Mark Lyttle,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacqueline-stevensphd/deporting-american-citize_b_265187.html.
52. Bosworth & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 438 (“Those who have already served a
criminal sentence arguably experience an inverted double jeopardy—tried once but punished
twice—when they are detained again prior to their removal rather than being deported
immediately following the completion of their criminal sentence.”); see also Stumpf, supra
note 37 (manuscript at 6) (“Immigration detention, however, relies upon a critical distinction
to remain within the doctrinal borders of administrative law rather than criminal law. The
central function of criminal law is to sort out who to punish and how. The central function of
immigration law is to sort out who can enter and remain in the United States and for how
long.”).
53. Bosworth & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 438.
54. See Alyssa Campbell, Due Process, Not Deportation, for the Immigration System’s
Hidden Population: Did the American Bar Association’s Civil Immigration Standard Fall
Short of Its Mission?, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581, 588 (2013) (focusing specifically on the
lack of representation for detainees with mental disabilities). A mere sixteen percent of
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immigration detention facilities is another stark example of the distinction.55
Nonetheless, there is now a growing tension with a legal construct of
immigration enforcement as civil in theory but increasingly punitive in
practice.
B. Immigration Detention’s Questionable Rationale Today
As discussed above, the conception and function of immigration detention
have been intrinsically tied to facilitating the deportation process. As such, the
initial rationale of immigration detention was that it constituted a
“constitutionally permissible liberty deprivation only to the extent necessary to
enforce compliance with immigration proceedings.”56 As discussed below, in
the modern historical context of the Cold War and post-9/11, immigration
detention has also been rationalized vis-à-vis times of national security threats.
The present-day mass incarceration of immigrants, however, does not appear to
be tied to either rationale.
Juliet Stumpf posits that the detention system exists today is decoupled
from the long-standing justification as being intrinsically related to the
government’s immigration enforcement powers, and instead operates as “the
mirror image of criminal detention.” 57 The transformation of immigration
detention is largely a product of the blurred lines between immigration and
criminal law generally, a phenomenon that Stumpf has coined “crimmigration
law.” 58 In the process, as former director of Immigration and Customs

detainees have legal representation. Seth Freed Wessler, Dispatch from Detention: A Rare
Look Inside Our ‘Humane’ Immigration Jails, COLORLINES (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/01/dispatch_from_detention_this_is_what_humane_dep
ortation_looks_like.html. Spurred by the rise in unaccompanied minors entering the United
States, groups have filed a lawsuit to force the government to provide legal representations
for children in removal proceedings. Mario Trujillo, Immigrant Groups File Suit to
Represent Unaccompanied Children Crossing Border, HILL (July 9, 2014),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/211695-lawsuit-filed-over-legal-representationfor-child-immigrants.
55. In the context of medical care, it has been noted that “[t]here are fundamental
problems with holding individuals in long-term custody under conditions designed for the
short term.” Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 602 (2010).
56. Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to
Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2012).
57. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 4-5); see also Miller, supra note 38, at 235
(“Detention has been used as a means of managing non-U.S. citizens for over a hundred
years, dating back to 1892 . . . . However, it is only within the past twenty years that
immigration detention has expanded beyond a few distinct facilities, into an expansive
network of custodial facilities varying dramatically in size, staffing, and supervision.”).
58. Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration law” to describe the phenomenon of the
line between criminal and immigration law becoming increasingly indistinct. Juliet Stumpf,
The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367, 376 (2006); see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L.
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Enforcement’s Office of Detention Policy and Planning Dora
Schriro acknowledges, detention has strayed from its administrative purpose of
facilitating the immigration process, and become a functionally punitive
system.59 One consequence of this shift is that “[d]etention facilities play a key
role in creating incentives for longer and more restrictive deprivations of
liberty.”60 This Subpart will summarize the considerable scholarship on modern
immigration legislative and policy reforms, focusing on the reforms that have
brought about what arguably is a transformation to the fundamental character
of immigration detention.61
The trend of criminalizing immigration, while historically rooted, is a
relatively recent phenomenon.62 The recent history began with the mass arrival
of Haitians, Cubans, and Central Americans seeking refuge in the United States
in the 1980s, which prompted en masse and prolonged detention practices63 that
first existed, albeit briefly, during the height of the Cold War.64 The legislative
changes that ensued created the bedrock for immigration enforcement and
detention practices in place today.65
The first pair of legislative changes during this period that specifically
impacted the detention of noncitizens was in 1986, with the passage of the

REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (describing the immigration detention system as “immcarceration”);
Miller, supra note 38, at 223-24 (“The immigration system has not simply imitated the
techniques of criminal punishment, it has become a hybrid system of ‘crimmigration’ as
criminal and immigration law enforcement procedures have converged . . . .”).
59. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 4.
60. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 52).
61. See generally Hernández, supra note 44 (arguing that since the 1980s, immigration
policy has “increasingly adopted the securitized approach of criminal law enforcement,”
while criminal law has borrowed “the more lax procedures traditionally used in the civil
immigration law system” when investigating crimes associated with immigration).
62. See David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 164-65 (2012) (describing the criminalization of immigration
enforcement as “[g]radual[] and then sudden[]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Congress blurred the boundary between criminal and immigration law as early as 1929,
when “Congress made illegal entry into the United States a misdemeanor and illegal entry
following deportation a felony.” Id. at 164.
63. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons
from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 935-36 (1995); see
also Evangeline G. Abriel, Ending the Welcome: Changes in the United States’ Treatment of
Undocumented Aliens (1986 to 1996), 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1998); Mark D.
Kemple, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of the Mariel Cubans
Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
1733, 1735-36 (1989) (describing how most of the 125,000 Mariel Cubans who fled to the
U.S. during the spring of 1980 were denied admission and detained at Guantanamo Bay and
in “camps in Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and the Atlanta Penitentiary in Georgia for
varying lengths of time”); Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in the United States
Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2394 (1994).
64. See infra Part II.A.1.
65. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1360 (2014).
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Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) and the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA).66 Known for igniting the “War on Drugs,”67 the ADAA significantly
expanded which drug offenses could lead to a noncitizen’s deportation.68 The
ADAA also amended the INA to introduce the practice of detainers,69 which
request that law enforcement officials hold an individual in criminal custody
for federal immigration officials. 70 IRCA, best known for its legalization
program71 and its regulation72 and criminalization73 of unauthorized work, also
66. The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments were also passed in 1986, which
rendered marrying for the purpose of immigration benefits a felony. Sklansky, supra note 62,
at 165.
67. Hernández contends that the U.S. government tapped into the country’s concerns
about drugs to expand immigration detention powers, stating, “Congress in effect envisioned
immigration detention as a central tool in the nation’s burgeoning war on drugs.” Hernández,
supra note 65, at 1349; see also Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy Stupid: The Hijacking
of the Debate over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on
Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583 (2010) (arguing that
immigration actually does not have anything to do with constructed phenomena such as the
war on drugs).
68. Hernández, supra note 65, at 1363 (noting that the ADAA replaced “a reference to
convictions involving an ‘addiction-sustaining opiate’ with much broader language
encompassing any conviction involving a state, federal, or foreign country’s controlled
substance”).
69. Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United
States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 690 (2013).
70 . See generally Alia Al-Khatib, Comment, Putting A Hold on ICE: Why Law
Enforcement Should Refuse to Honor Immigration Detainers, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 109 (2014).
There has been considerable discussion as to whether the detainer provision requires or
merely requests that noncitizens be held for the purposes of transfer to ICE custody. See
KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL
ISSUES 12-15 (2014); Lasch, supra note 69, at 629, 695 (arguing that a detainer is only a
request and “does not bind the receiving agency in any way”); Third Circuit Appeals Court
Rules that Immigration Detainers Are Non-Binding Requests in Ground-Breaking Case,
ACLU (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/third-circuit-appeals-courtrules-immigration-detainers-are-non-binding-requests; Gosia Wozniacka, Oregon Ruling
Spurs Halt on Immigration Detainers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17, 2014)
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oregon-ruling-spurs-halt-immigration-detainers.
71. “IRCA had an immediate and dramatic effect on the lives of millions of
unauthorized immigrants who legalized their status,” and ultimately around 2.7 million
individuals were able to legalize their status. Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner & Claire
Bergeron, At Its 25th Anniversary, IRCA’s Legacy Lives on, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Nov.
16, 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/its-25th-anniversary-ircas-legacy-lives.
72. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 987 (“Prior to
IRCA, the relationship between employer and undocumented employee was not a direct
object of immigration regulation.”).
73 . See Sklansky, supra note 62, at 165 (describing how the IRCA criminalized
working without authorization, including the use of false documents). See generally DAVID
BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES
IMMIGRANTS (2008) (documenting the effect of increased work criminalization on immigrant
communities). The criminalization of workers also directly caused increased enforcement,
including detention of noncitizens, especially during the George W. Bush Administration,
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“blurred the boundary between civil detention and penal detention by
encouraging the confinement of excludable and deportable individuals in
prisons operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.” 74 Additionally, IRCA
encouraged the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to use
detention as part of its investigative process, especially for noncitizens
convicted of a felony.75 Lastly, amendments in 1988 to the ADAA further
impacted the function of immigration detention by creating the category of
“aggravated felonies.”76 Initially a classification that covered only murder, drug
trafficking, and weapon trafficking,77 Congress in subsequent years drastically
expanded what qualifies as an aggravated felony so that it has become, as
Nancy Morawetz puts it, an “Alice-in-Wonderland-like definition . . . [where
the] crime need not be either aggravated or a felony.”78
The other major set of legislative reforms that propelled the present-day
mass incarceration of immigrants was in 1996,79 with the enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). These laws
came on the heels of the Oklahoma City bombing, and so “images of migrant
criminality became an important justification for the [1996] legislation,”80 even

which emphasized workplace raids. See David Bacon & Bill Ong Hing, The Rise and Fall of
Employer Sanctions, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 77, 79-80 (2010); Bosniak, supra note 72, at
988 (“In recent years . . . the single most significant site of INS law enforcement, after the
immediate border area itself, has been the workplace.”). Bacon and Hing also point out that
the notion of employer sanctions was not created by the 1986 law, but instead dates back to
1952. Bacon & Hing, supra at 85.
74. Hernández, supra note 65, at 1364.
75. Id. at 1363.
76. Id. at 1366.
77. Gerald Seipp, The Aggravated Felony Concept in Immigration Law: Traps for the
Unwary and Opportunities for the Knowledgeable, 02-01 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (Jan.
2002).
78. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000) (“For example, a
conviction for simple battery or for shoplifting with a one-year suspended sentence—either
of which would be a misdemeanor or a violation in most states—can be deemed an
aggravated felony.”).
79. There were laws enacted throughout the 1990s and before 1996 that steadily
widened the breadth of criminalizing immigrants, including: the Immigration Act of 1990;
the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991; the
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994; and the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. For example, the Immigration Act of 1990
expanded what constitutes aggravated felonies to include “crimes of violence” for which
there were at least a five-year sentence of imprisonment and in 1994, Congress added
additional crimes, including certain fraud and money laundering offenses. Seipp, supra note
77, at 1-2.
80. Chacón, supra note 38, at 1843; see also MICHAEL WELCH, Panic, Risk, Control:
Conceptualizing Threats in a Post-9/11 Society, in PUNISHING IMMIGRANTS: POLICY,
POLITICS, AND INJUSTICE 17, 18-19 (Charis E. Kubrin et al. eds., 2012).
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though the perpetrator was American-born Timothy McVeigh.81
AEDPA also “requires mandatory detention of noncitizens convicted on a
broad array of offenses, including minor drug offenses,” and IIRIRA further
expanded the list of offenses triggering detention. 82 For example, asylum
seekers, regardless of their criminal history, became subject to mandatory
detention.83 By imposing mandatory detention on a wide swath of noncitizens,
AEDPA and IIRIRA marked an about-face from the status quo of parole
alternatives to detention that was in place since the INA was enacted in 1952.84
The other significant provision of IIRIRA that impacted the scope of
detention was the creation of INA section 287(g), which allowed for the
deputization of local law enforcement officers to enforce immigration laws.85
AEDPA was an anti-immigration law veiled as an antiterrorism measure—a
tactic that became virtually ubiquitous in the post-9/11 era—and IIRIRA,
marketed as attacking “illegal immigration,” in fact significantly impacted
lawful permanent residents by “convert[ing] many . . . into criminal aliens.”86
The 1996 legislation capped a decade of overhauling an immigration system
that now “codif[ied] a zero tolerance enforcement strategy against

81. Ella Dlin, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: An Attempt
to Quench Anti-Immigration Sentiments?, 38 CATH. LAW. 49, 50-51 (1998); Kevin R.
Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary
Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 300 (2000).
82 . ROBERT KOULISH, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: SUBVERTING THE
RULE OF LAW 49 (2010); see also Morawetz, supra note 78 at 1936, 1946.
83. See Whitney Chelgren, Note, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is
Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1477, 1484 (2011); Kristen M. Jarvis Johnson, Fearing the United States: Rethinking
Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 589, 590 (2007).
84. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DIASPORA 11-12 (2012). Noncitizens subject to mandatory detention may request
a Joseph hearing, which is a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether the
classification is proper. These hearings are tainted, however, by procedural problems. See
Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less
Process than “Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1833, 1849 (2011).
85. Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible
Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 121 (2012). Intended as a public safety program
targeting “criminal aliens and terrorists,” about half of the arrests made under the program
have led to the detention of noncitizens with misdemeanors, including traffic violations.
RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: 287(G)
STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 2 (2011), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/delegation-and-divergence-287g-state-and-localimmigration-enforcement. In some jurisdictions, misdemeanor arrests account for as high as
eighty percent of the arrests. Id.
86. Chacón, supra note 38, at 1846. It is important to note that these legislative
changes were applied retroactively, which meant that long-time legal permanent residents
with old convictions suddenly found themselves in the immigration system. See, e.g.,
Bernstein, supra note 13.

January 2015]

“VOLUNTARY” DETAINEE LABOR

17

immigrants.”87
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, solidified the rhetorical and
operational association between immigration and criminal law, although the
legislative changes merging the two systems had already largely occurred.88
One of the most significant impacts of 9/11 on the immigration system is what
Allegra McLeod calls “institutional repurposing”: the reorganization of
institutions involved in immigration enforcement with the purported goal of
focusing on “criminal aliens.”89
The most drastic reorganization was the dismantling of the INS and
creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.90 The
other significant shift was increased collaboration with the criminal justice
system, from its technology to personnel, for immigration enforcement.91 One
example was the piloting in 2008 of the Secure Communities program, which
expanded the 287(g) program by allowing local law enforcement to share
arrestees’ fingerprints with immigration officials.92 Post-9/11 also drew the forprofit prison industry squarely into the immigration detention business: “Many
[prison] companies struggled in the late 1990s amid a glut of private prison
construction, with more facilities built than could be filled, but a spike in
immigrant detention after Sept. 11 helped revitalize the industry.”93
87. KOULISH, supra note 82, at 41; see also Hernández, supra note 65, at 1369 (“By the
mid-1990s prisons had become a fact of life and a go-to tactic for legislators engaged in drug
war legislating, and immigrants were not exempted.”).
88. McLeod, supra note 85, at 121 (“It is worth noting that the significant changes in
U.S. criminal-immigration law occurred during the 1990s, well before September 11, 2001.
In the aftermath of that day, however, criminal-immigration enforcement became an
increasingly central component of the U.S. immigration regulatory regime, even though the
pivotal moment of expansion of criminal-immigration enforcement powers happened several
years earlier.”).
89. Id. at 121-22.
90. DHS was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Creation of the
Department
of
Homeland
Security,
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). It is
made up of twenty-two sub-agencies, including a handful encompassing the constellation of
immigration agencies such as the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
Who Joined DHS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs (last
visited Oct. 10, 2014).
91. The post-9/11 collaboration between the criminal justice and immigration system
was a two-way street, insofar as the immigration system was used to charge and hold
suspected terrorists against whom the government did not have enough evidence to charge
and hold criminally. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and
Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 6 (2006).
92. MICHELLE MITTELSTADT ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., THROUGH THE PRISM OF
NATIONAL SECURITY: MAJOR IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE DECADE
SINCE 9/11 11 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS23_Post-911policy.pdf; see also Lasch, supra note 69, at 677.
93. Urbina, supra note 24. Although there has been growth in immigration detention
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One year after DHS was in operation, the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act required DHS to add 8000 detention beds, contingent
upon funding from Congress. 94 Congress provided the funds, committing
support in 2005 for 18,500 beds in the detention system.95 But this was only the
beginning of the immigration detention boom. The number of beds increased
by eighty-four percent after 2005. 96 By 2009, the number of immigrants
detained by the government was at 33,400 per day, a number reflecting a new
Congressional quota, or “bed mandate,” added to DHS’s annual spending
budget.97 This “bed mandate” requires ICE to detain a minimum number of
individuals on average per day,98 and today the mandate stands at 34,000.99 The
quota is emblematic of today’s runaway immigration detention system—as
Stumpf has put it, “[t]he ‘bed mandate’ is the most visible manifestation of
detention driving deportation.”100
The drastic changes to the immigration system have indicated a broader
shift in immigration policy from pursuing a largely administrative function to
having a retributive agenda, the latter of which “is rooted in mythologies of
after 9/11 in response to the legislative changes highlighted above, this growth started before
9/11. In 1985, the daily number of detained immigrants was about 2200; in 1995, this
number tripled to 6600 per day. WILSHER, supra note 31, at 70.
94. William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress Mandates Jail Beds for 34,000
Immigrants
as
Private Prisons Profit,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
24,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-24/congress-fuels-private-jails-detaining-34-000immigrants.html.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. JENNIFER E. LAKE & BLAS NUÑEZ-NETO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34482,
HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT: FY2009 APPROPRIATIONS 35, 36, 40 (2009).
98. Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH.
POST (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drivesimmigration-detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a1a919f2ed890_story.html.
99. This past year Congress voted on the mandate (as opposed to passing it via
appropriations), and DHS testified that the quota is at least 2000 more than necessary. Andy
Sullivan, Insight: Congress Keeps Detention Quota Despite Immigration Debate, REUTERS
(July 8, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/08/us-usa-immigrationdetention-insight-idUSBRE96711920130708. The mandate nonetheless passed. Miroff,
supra note 98. For a breakdown on how much it costs to keep this number of immigrants
detained see NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES
(2013), available at http://immigrationforum.org/blog/the-math-of-immigration-detention-2.
100. Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 60). Immigration detention has not only
changed in scope, but also in duration. In 1981, the average detention length was four days.
By 1994, that number increased to 26.5 days; from 2001 to today, the average duration of
detention is about 29.5 days. There is a significant variation on this average, depending on a
noncitizen’s immigration status and nationality. The number of detainees “held for more
than 180 days following an order of removal increased from 1,847 in 1994 to 5,266 in
2001.” WILSHER, supra note 31, at 70. Mexicans were “swiftly removed . . . . [n]onMexicans . . . were detained for sixty-three days. For one-quarter of the countries to which
aliens were removed detention periods averaged over 120 days.” Id.
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migrant criminality . . . .” 101 This trend is part of the broader pattern of
criminalizing communities of color in the United States.102 The United States
currently “has the highest rate of [criminal] incarceration in the world, dwarfing
the rates of nearly every developed country . . . . No other country in the world
imprisons so many of its racial or ethnic minorities.”103 It therefore, perhaps,
should not come as a surprise that the detention of noncitizens is now the new
wave of mass incarceration in our country.
C. Mass Incarceration of Noncitizens and the For-Profit Prison Industry
While detaining individuals the government sought to deport was atypical
in the not-so-distant past, today it has become virtually “commonplace.”104 In
Schriro’s 2009 report, ICE acknowledges the nexus between recent policy
changes, such as those mentioned in the previous Subpart, and the population
explosion in immigration detention facilities.105 One of the ramifications of the
spike in demand for detention facilities over a relatively short period of time is
that the immigration detention system has heavily borrowed, if not mimicked
completely, the prison system. 106 With a record-breaking number of

101. Chacón, supra note 38, at 1890-91; see also Hernández, supra note 44, at 1458
(“[T]he procedural and substantive law that comprises crimmigration law has reimagined
noncitizens as criminal deviants and security risks.”). Although outside the scope of this
Article, it is important to note that the legislative changes described in this Subpart also
caused a spike in immigration-related criminal prosecutions, which is distinct from detention
and removal based on immigration violations. Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122
YALE L.J. 2282, 2286-87 (2013) (“Today, immigration crime is the largest single category of
crime prosecuted by the federal government and noncitizens are over one-fourth of federal
prisoners.”); Legomsky, supra note 46, at 476; McLeod, supra note 85, at 107 (“Between
1990 and 2010, immigration offenses became the most common federally prosecuted crimes
in the United States.” (footnote omitted)); Sklansky, supra note 62, at 166 (“Over a twelveyear period, from 1997 to 2009, immigration prosecutions per year grew more than tenfold,
from less than 9,000 to 90,000.”).
102. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 27; Angela Davis, Race and
Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
GENDER: SELECTED READINGS 204 (Joseph F. Healey & Eileen O’Brien eds., 2d ed. 2007).
103. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 6; see also Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America:
Why Do We Lock up So Many People?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america
(“Mass
incarceration on a scale almost unexampled in human history is a fundamental fact of our
country today—perhaps the fundamental fact, as slavery was the fundamental fact of 1850.
In truth, there are more black men in the grip of the criminal-justice system . . . than were in
slavery then. Over all, there are now more people under ‘correctional supervision’ in
America—more than six million—than were in the Gulag Archipelago under Stalin at its
height.”).
104. Sklansky, supra note 62, at 182.
105. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 11-12.
106. But see Stumpf, supra note 58, at 402 (“[T]he rapid importation of criminal
grounds into immigration law is consistent with a shift in criminal penology from
rehabilitation to harsher motivations: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and the
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deportations, “a vast network of immigration detention facilities has emerged—
a kind of parallel prison system, operating alongside and in conjunction with
the network of facilities for criminal detention and punishment.”107 In fact,
immigration detention facilities often use the same physical spaces and
personnel as prisons and jails.108
The immigration detention system today “is a sprawling and varied
system”109 comprised of approximately 250 facilities.110 Some are processing
centers where, as the name suggests, individuals charged with removable
immigration offenses are detained pending processing, and often are moved to
another facility. The second type of detention structures is dedicated facilities,
where all of the beds in the facility are used to hold immigration detainees. The
last type is shared-use jails, where individuals held on criminal and
immigration charges are incarcerated in the same facility.111
Despite the fact that DHS oversees the largest detention system in the
country,112 its operations are not bound by regulation.113 Instead, immigration
detention facilities are governed by “standards,” which are adopted from the
criminal justice system: “The national detention standards that the [former]
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) introduced in 2000 . . . . which
were then updated by ICE in 2008, are based upon the American Correctional
Association (ACA) jail detention standards for pretrial felons.”114 In 2010, in
response to a slew of detainee deaths and reports of misconduct within the
facilities, “DHS replaced the National Detention Standards with the
Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS),” but substantively
“the two are strikingly similar.”115 Despite advocacy efforts to make them fully
enforceable,116 they “remain mere guidelines.”117

expressive power of the state.”).
107. Sklansky, supra note 62, at 182.
108. See Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 46) (“When the immigration detention
system uses the same facilities, procedures, and personnel as the criminal detention system,
the detention experience becomes indistinguishable from that of criminal punishment.”).
109. Sklansky, supra note 62, at 183.
110. Urbina, supra note 24.
111. Miller, supra note 38, at 235-36.
112. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 2.
113. See, e.g., Maunica Sthanki, Reconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and the
Need for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 450 (2013) (noting that the ICE
“standards are unenforceable”); Noah Nehemiah Gillespie, Note, Positive Law: Providing
Adequate Medical Care for HIV-Positive Immigration Detainees, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1329, 1339 (2013) (stating that ICE standards are “policies” that “are not legally binding”).
114. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 16.
115. Chelgren, supra note 83, at 1487-88.
116. ACLU, HOLIDAY ON ICE: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S NEW
IMMIGRATION
DETENTION
STANDARDS
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_detention_standards_hearing_statement_final_2.pdf
(stating that the PBNDS “are only the first step” in improving detention facilities, and while
significant and necessary, more action is needed).
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Immigration detention facilities, therefore, operate like jails and prisons,118
only worse. Unlike their criminal counterparts, there is no “automatic judicial
oversight of immigration detention centers . . . .”119 While the programs and
services in detention are required and regulated by statute and case law,
effective compliance is difficult to achieve.120 Moreover, detainees are often
held outside the jurisdiction in which they were arrested, far away from their
families and resources. 121 Given this context, many practices within
immigration detention facilities, including “voluntary” paid detainee labor, are
troublesome.
1. The Role of For-Profit Corporations and the Historical Use of Custodial
Labor
Each of the three types of immigration detention facilities mentioned above
are “owned or operated, to varying degrees, by private companies.”122 Forprofit corporations began to get into the prison business in the early 1980s,
“when the criminal justice policies in the United States underwent a period of
intense politicization and harsh transformation,” including “[d]raconian
sentencing laws and get-tough correctional policies.”123 During this era, the

117. Conditions
in
Immigration
Detention,
DET.
WATCH
NETWORK,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2383 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
118. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 4.
119. Bosworth & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 437.
120. SCHRIRO, supra note 9, at 23, 25; see also ACLU, PRISONERS OF PROFIT:
IMMIGRANTS AND DETENTION IN GEORGIA 14-17 (May 2012), available at
http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/42/244/ (outlining problems in several
Georgia immigration detention facilities, including access to phone services, religious
services, and recreational time); DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE, ONE YEAR
LATER: THE ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2013), available at
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ExposeAndClose (describing complaints about lack
of access to healthcare, restrictions on fresh air, sanitation, and solitary confinement, in
select detention facilities across the country).
121. See Kirk Semple & Tim Eaton, Detention for Immigrants That Looks Less Like
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/us/modelimmigration-detention-center-unveiled-in-texas.html?_r=0 (“Critics . . . . accused
immigration officials of impinging on detainees’ civil rights by frequently transferring them
from jail to jail, often far away from their families and lawyers.”).
122. Chelgren, supra note 83, at 1486.
123. Judith Greene, Banking on the Prison Boom, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES
MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 3, 3-4 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007); see
also Ryan S. Marion, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case Against
State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 232–33 (2009); Ari
Melber, Presumed Guilty: How Prisons Profit off the ‘War on Drugs’ (MSNBC television
broadcast Aug. 14, 2013), available at http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/presumed-guilty-howprisons-profit-the; Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a
New Form of Slavery?, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Mar. 31, 2014), available at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states-big-business-or-anew-form-of-slavery/8289.
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Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and Geo Group Inc. (GEO) grew to
be the two largest prison corporations in the United States,124 and at U.S.
taxpayers’ expense. 125 Private corporations not only made profits running
facilities, they also have scored lucrative contracts for services related to
incarceration, 126 including providing meals, 127 telephone services, 128 money
transfers,129 prisoner transportation,130 and even medical care.131
The parallel legislative and policy changes during the 1980s and 1990s
related to the increased criminalization of immigration discussed in Part I.B
also opened the door for companies to enter the detention business.132 The post9/11 era saw the “outsourcing [of] immigration control,” 133 including
immigration detention facilities, helping CCA’s revenue to grow more than

124. See supra note 23.
125. See Ray Downs, Who’s Getting Rich off the Prison-Industrial Complex?, VICE

(May 2013), http://www.vice.com/read/whos-getting-rich-off-the-prison-industrial-complex.
Both the CCA and the GEO have restructured internally so that they can be classified as Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which are exempt from paying federal taxes. Nathaniel
Popper, Restyled as Real Estate Trusts, Varied Businesses Avoid Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
21,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/business/restyled-as-real-estate-trustsvaried-businesses-avoid-taxes.html?_r=0.
126. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437
(2005). Hedge funds and banks invest heavily in prison corporations and thus are also
significant profiteers of the industry. Vanguard and Fidelity Investments are two more
investment management companies that own large stakes in CCA and GEO Group. Downs,
supra note 125.
127. See Paul Egan, Michigan Prison Food Vendor Fined $98,000 for Worker
Fraternization, Menu Problems, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 11, 2014, 8:15 PM),
http://www.freep.com/article/20140311/NEWS06/303110103/michigan-department-ofcorrections-fines-prison-food-vendor.
128. Steven J. Jackson, Mapping the Prison Telephone Industry, in PRISON PROFITEERS:
WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 235, 235 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright
eds., 2007).
129. Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prisons, Sky-High Phone Rates
and
Money
Transfer
Fees,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
26,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/business/in-prisons-sky-high-phone-rates-and-moneytransfer-fees.html?_r=0.
130. Alex Friedmann, For-Profit Transportation Companies: Taking Prisoners and the
Public for a Ride, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION
265, 265 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007).
131. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 510–
11 (2005).
132. For-profit prison companies also contracted with governments to operate half-way
houses, juvenile facilities, and work-release programs. Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio,
Note, Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J.
CORP. L. 577, 582-83 (2008); see also Stumpf, supra note 58, at 403 (“From the 1950s
through the 1970s, both criminal and immigration sanctions reflected a rehabilitation
model . . . [which] fell into disfavor after the 1970s.”).
133 . Robert Koulish, Privatization of Immigration Control, in IMMIGRATION AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: SUBVERTING THE RULE OF LAW 75 (2010).
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sixty percent over the past decade.134 Today, CCA and GEO combined “hold[]
almost two-thirds of all immigrants detained each day.”135
In the Introduction, we heard Hassall Moses describe detainee labor as
“modern-day slavery” that constitutes the “backbone” of the Northwest
Detention Center facility in which he was detained. Another detainee, Pedro
Guzman, who was held in the Stewart Detention Center in Georgia, reported
that ninety percent of the jobs in the CCA-operated facility is done by
detainees.136 During his almost twenty-month detention, Guzman “cleaned the
communal areas, cooked, painted walls, ran paperwork and buffed floors.”137
Guzman earned a dollar a day for his work, except when he worked in the
kitchen, where he earned three dollars a day.138 Professor Jacqueline Stevens,
who has investigated the issue of detainee labor extensively, states: “[T]he ICE
jails are paying people $1/day for work that minimum wage laws would require
compensated at $29-$58/day.”139 As a result, detainee labor adds up to save the
entities that run immigration detention facilities “$40 million or more a
year.”140
Immigrant detainee labor is a continuation of the American practice of
exploiting labor through incarceration. Exploited custodial labor first emerged
on the backs of African Americans in the infamous forms of convict leasing
and chain gangs following the abolition of slavery—or in Douglas Blackmon’s
words, convict forced labor became “slavery by another name.”141 Convict
leasing “functioned with the Black Codes to reestablish and maintain the race
relationships of slavery by returning the control over the lives of these African
Americans to white plantation owners.” 142 Southern states phased out the
convict lease system by the turn of the nineteenth century, but at that same time
“prisoners were increasingly being made to work in the most brutal form of
convict forced labor in the United States, the chain gang.”143 Today, cheap
134. Urbina, supra note 24.
135. Selway & Newkirk, supra note 94 (“[CCA] and Geo have each about doubled in

value since mid-2010.”).
136. Yana Kunichoff, “Voluntary” Work Program Run in Private Detention Centers
Pays Detained Immigrants $1 a Day, TRUTHOUT (July 27, 2012), http://truthout.org/news/item/10548-voluntary-work-program-run-in-private-detention-centers-paysdetained-immigrants-1-a-day.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Urbina, supra note 24.
141. BLACKMON, supra note 26.
142. Julie Browne, The Labor of Doing Time, in CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: CONFRONTING
THE PRISON CRISIS 61, 63 (Elihu Rosenblatt ed., 1996); see also ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE
THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH
19 (1996) (stating that “[c]onvict labor depended upon both the heritage of slavery and the
allure of industrial capitalism”).
143. Browne, supra note 142, at 64 (noting that chain gangs were specifically created
to labor for the expansion of public roads and highways at the time).
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labor in the criminal context is a widespread practice both inside and outside
penitentiary walls. While largely less physically brutal than its historical
counterpart, the practice continues to be an economic boon for both the public
and private sector.144
The remainder of this Article focuses on the analog to prison labor in the
immigration detention setting—detainee labor. In doing so, it will emphasize
the legal, policy, and institutional differences between the criminal and
immigration detention systems in which these forms of custodial labor operate.
However, while a thorough examination of the subject is beyond the scope of
this Article, it is important to at least note here that the trajectories of racism,
criminalization, as well as structural forces such as law and capitalism, in many
ways link prison labor specifically to the general systemic problems of
immigrant work. Made in the context of opposition to federal immigration
reform, Representative Dana Rohrabacher captured some of the complex
connections between the two forms of exploited work when he declared, “Let
the prisoners pick the fruits. We can do it without bringing in millions of
foreigners.”145

144. Beneficiaries of prison labor today include universities and the federal
government. Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAL. U. L. REV. 857, 868 (2008)
(“[O]ffice furniture, especially in state universities and the federal government, is a major
prison labor product. Inmates also take hotel reservations at corporate call centers, make
body armor for the U.S. military, and manufacture prison chic fashion accessories, in
addition to the iconic task of stamping license plates.” (citations omitted)). Moreover, megacorporations such as Starbucks, Boeing, BP, Victoria’s Secret, McDonalds, and Walmart all
profit from prison labor. Nicole Goodkind, Top 5 Secrets of the Private Prison Industry,
YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 6, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/top-5-secretsprivate-prison-industry-163005314.html; Sadhbh Walshe, How US Prison Labour Pads
Corporate
Profits
at
Taxpayers’
Expense,
GUARDIAN
(July
6,
2012)
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/06/prison-labor-pads-corporate-profitstaxpayers-expense; Abe Louise Young, BP Hires Prison Labor to Clean up Spill While
Coastal
Residents
Struggle,
NATION
(July
21,
2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/37828/bp-hires-prison-labor-clean-spill-while-coastalresidents-struggle.
145. Zatz, supra note 144, at 859 (citing Carl Hulse & Rachel L. Swarns,
Conservatives Stand Firm on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A12). Alabama
lost a significant portion of its agricultural workforce after it passed an anti-immigration law
in 2011, and the head of the state’s agricultural department suggested replacing these
workers with prison laborers. See, e.g., Amanda Peterson Beadle, Alabama Official Suggests
Using Prisoners As Farm Workers After Immigration Law Scares Away Laborers,
THINKPROGRESS
(Oct.
7,
2011,
3:40
PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/10/07/338922/alabama-prisoners-immigrants-farmlabor/.
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II. VOLUNTARY PAID DETAINEE LABOR
A. Legislative History
In 1950, two years before the enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), the comprehensive body of federal law governing
immigration,146 Congress passed what stands today as the legal authority for
voluntary paid labor in immigration detention facilities.147 The objective of the
1950 law generally was to authorize the Department of Justice (DOJ) to surpass
the appropriations process 148 to incur what was characterized as recurring
“administrative expenses.” 149 Providing for paid detainee labor was a
subsection of a bill that covered many areas,150 but it received considerable
attention during congressional deliberations.
Section 6 of the DOJ expenditure bill contained the provision providing for
the payment of noncitizens held in detention for work performed. Section 6
generally addressed a range of expenditures relating specifically to the INS,
including paying interpreters and translators who are not citizens and
distributing citizenship textbooks to detainees without cost.151 The provision
authorizing paid detainee labor, Section 6(d), read as follows: “Appropriations

146. Prior to the INA, Congress passed piecemeal immigration legislation starting in
1882. See supra text accompanying note 28.
147. 8 U.S.C. §1555(d) (2013).
148. The letter from then DOJ Acting Assistant to the Attorney General, Peter
Campbell Brown, included in the Congressional Report on the bill, stated: “In order to
preclude the raising of points of order against the Department of Justice appropriation bills
on the ground that certain expenditures provided for therein have not previously been
authorized by law, it is recommended that legislation be enacted to supply substantive law
for such recurring items.” S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 2 (1950).
149. This intent was in line with what at the time was the policy of eliminating
legislative language from appropriation bills. See 96 CONG. REC. 5315, 5326 (1950). The
bill, entitled “Authorization of Certain Administrative Expenses for Department of Justice,”
id., had the stated purpose of “enact[ing] into substantive law authorization for certain items
that frequently recur in the Appropriation Act dealing with administrative expenses incurred
by the Department of Justice.” S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 1 (1950).
150. The legislation has nine sections in total, each of which addresses a specific
classification of expenses concerning operations within the DOJ: (1) Costs associated with
trials, including payment of notarial fees and compensation to witnesses; (2) Expenses
related to the transfer of drug-addicted prisoners; (3) Permission to purchase new books and
periodicals by using the proceeds made by selling older ones; (4) Costs associated with
internal investigations within the DOJ, as well as of officials of U.S. District Courts; (5)
Expenditures related to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s response to “unforeseen
emergencies”; (6) Costs of certain functions carried out by the Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS); (7) Expenses related to the Bureau of Prison’s continued
care of mentally ill inmates; (8) Permanent authority to the Attorney General to purchase
land adjacent to federal penitentiaries; and (9) Correction of a bookkeeping problem so that
funds related to charging prison personnel for meals, laundry service, etc., are credited to the
DOJ’s, not Treasury’s, coffers. Id. at 2-3.
151. Id. at 2.
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now or hereafter provided for the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall
be available for . . . (d) payment of allowances (at such rate as may be specified
from time to time in the appropriation act involved) to aliens, while held in
custody under the immigration laws, for work performed.”152
Section 6(d) was a late addition to the bill,153 and the DOJ, in a letter to the
Senate Judiciary Committee chair, Patrick McCarran, explained that it was
“included at the urgent request of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization to meet a practical problem encountered in the work of that
Service.”154 The DOJ elaborated further during a House Judiciary Committee
hearing by testifying that the payment of allowances to immigrant detainees for
work performed would help the INS maintain order in detention facilities,
specifically that the “problem of maintaining these aliens in detention is greatly
minimized if they can put an alien to some useful work and pay him a modest
daily return for the work he does.”155 The type of work contemplated was
described as “[a]ny kind of work around the detention center or camp, such as
policing the place, cooking, or, possibly, attending some small garden farm or
plot.”156
During the same House Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative
Samuel Francis Hobbs raised the question of whether detainee labor constituted
a form of punishment. The DOJ witness, George Miller, assured the
Congressman that it was not:
Mr. Hobbs. Is it clear that it is voluntary? It was held in the Michigan case
decided by the Supreme Court157 that we had no authority to detain them, even
in a case of deportation, at hard labor. Is this purely voluntary?
Mr. Miller. I should say it is voluntary. Certainly there is no intention I
have ever heard of that these people would be forced to labor.158

When asked about the practice at the time related to detainees performing
labor, Miller testified that they work, but do not get paid:
[Representative Clyde] Reed. How do they do it now, without this law?
Mr. Miller. They do not pay them.

152. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 3 (1950) (language from H.R. 4645).
153. See id. at 4-5, 21 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the Accounts
Branch, Department of Justice).
154. S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 2 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 81-2309, at 3 (1950).
155. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 21 (1950) (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the
Accounts Branch, Department of Justice).
156. Id. at 22-30 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the Accounts
Branch, Department of Justice).
157. Rep. Hobbs was referring to Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896),
which was decided by the Supreme Court on appeal from the Eastern District of Michigan.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-45 for a discussion of Wong Wing.
158. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 31 (1950).
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Mr. Reed. They do not pay them anything, and they do work. It must be
voluntary.
Mr. Miller. Yes.159

The DOJ mentioned “eighty cents or a dollar a day” as a suggested rate of
pay for detainee labor, but deferred to the appropriations process to fix the rate
of pay.160 Congress set the rate of pay in 1950 at one dollar a day, which today
would be equivalent to about $9.80.161
1. Political Context
There were two important events surrounding the enactment of the DOJ
expenditure bill that help explain why the government sought to authorize the
payment of voluntary detainee labor. The first involved the DOJ’s priorities in
the era of McCarthyism. The subject matter of the legislation generally was of
interest in a period of investigations and prosecutions of suspected communists,
and the era brought a relative spike in immigration detentions specifically.162
The second was the ratification of the Geneva Convention’s protections for
prisoners of war, which directly influenced the DOJ’s decision to add the
provision authorizing payment for immigrant detainee labor into the
expenditure bill.163
The overall purpose of the DOJ expenditure bill was to give the agency
greater leeway in its operations, by decoupling its expenditure decisions from
the congressional appropriations process.164 In the context of the McCarthy Era,
this facially administrative purpose becomes more politically charged.
Historically, the years immediately following World War I were marked by the
Palmer Raids, named after then DOJ Attorney General Alexander Mitchell
Palmer. These raids became the hallmark of the First Red Scare, leading to
more than 10,000 arrests.165 The 1950 expenditure bill was introduced when the
DOJ was amid another wave of targeting suspected communists in the United
States,166 and although the legislative history is not explicit in this regard, the

159. Id. at 31-32.
160. In the discussions with me about this provision it was proposed to pay the alien eighty
cents or a dollar a day for his work, but, as I say, whether it is 25 cents or $1.50 a day would
be determined by the rate to be fixed of this provision in the Appropriation Act.

Id. at 21 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the Accounts Branch,
Department of Justice). Miller also suggested that the Appropriations Committee can
specify the rate of payment “from time to time” so that “this [the amount paid] will not
get out of hand.” Id.
161. Urbina, supra note 24.
162. See infra text accompanying note 170.
163. See infra text accompanying note 173.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 148-149.
165. Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons from
History, 87 MASS. L. REV. 72, 78 (2002).
166 . See generally Irving Louis Horowitz, Culture, Politics, and McCarthyism: A
Retrospective from the Trenches, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 357 (1996); Mari J. Matsuda,
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subject of the DOJ bill—flexibility in agency expenditures—would facilitate
expedient arrests and prosecutions. Therefore, it may not be surprising that the
sponsor of the bill, Senator Patrick McCarran, was himself avidly
anticommunist.167
The zealous efforts of the Palmer Raids specifically targeted noncitizens.168
Although the legislative history of the 1950 DOJ bill is not explicit on this
particular issue, the arrests and prosecutions of accused noncitizen communists
already underway were likely at least partly what the DOJ meant when it
justified INS’s expenditure authorization to be for “certain confidential
expenditures for unforeseen emergencies.”169 In fact, Congress passed the DOJ
legislation amidst a spike in the government’s use of immigration detention:
“Fears of Communist subversion between 1948 and 1952 saw 2,000 lawfully
resident foreigners held [in detention] . . . pending expulsion on the basis of
secret evidence.”170 Putting detainees to work and paying them a nominal fee
for their labor was, as the DOJ testified, a way to maintain order, which would
have been of particular concern in an unprecedented period of heightened

Foreword: McCarthyism, The Internment and the Contradictions of Power, 19 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 9 (1998-1999).
167. Senator McCarran was also the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair at the time.
Senator Harry Reid vividly described Senator McCarran as “one of the most antiSemitic . . . one of the most anti-black, one of the most prejudiced people who has ever
served in the Senate.” Richard N. Velotta, Harry Reid: Pat McCarran’s Name Shouldn’t Be
On
Anything,
LAS
VEGAS
SUN
(Aug.
25,
2012),
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/aug/25/harry-reid-pat-mccarrans-name-shouldnt-beanything. The McCarran Act (also known as the Internal Security Act of 1950) “required all
members of ‘Communist-front’ organizations to register with the . . . government.” Natsu
Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of
COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051,
1077–78 (2002). Notably, McCarran co-sponsored the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act (the McCarran-Walter Act), which imposed strict immigration entry quotas and allowed
for the deportation of “dangerous” aliens.” See ALICIA J. CAMPI, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR.,
THE MCCARRAN-WALTER ACT: A CONTRADICTORY LEGACY ON RACE, QUOTAS, AND
IDEOLOGY (2004) (noting that allowing for the deportation of dangerous aliens is part of the
reason why President Truman vetoed the bill, although his veto was overridden by Congress
and
the
bill
became
law),
available
at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Brief21%20-%20McCarranWalter.pdf.
168. See Frank W. Dunham, Jr., The Thirty-Second Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture on
Criminal Law: Where Moussaoui Meets Hamdi, 183 MIL. L. REV. 151, 159 (2005) (noting
that during the Palmer Raids, over 1000 people were deported to Russia without due
process); Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to Deportation
Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 317 n.382 (2004) (“The Palmer Raids were a series of
mass arrests conducted under the direction of U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer,
leading to the deportation of alleged subversives . . . . By the early 1920s, the anti-radicalism
and xenophobia that triggered the Palmer Raids helped give rise to the racially
discriminatory national origins immigration quotas of the early 1920s.”).
169. S. REP. NO. 81-1258, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 81-2309, at 3.
170. WILSHER, supra note 31, at 59.
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detentions.171
The other event that specifically influenced the government’s inclusion of
Section 6(d) into the omnibus DOJ bill was the ratification of the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.172 This time, the
legislative history is explicit, as the DOJ testified during the House Judiciary
Committee hearing that the provision providing allowances for immigrant
detainee work was modeled after the Convention: “It [Section 6(d)] is along the
lines of the prisoner of war provision under the Geneva Convention, whereby
prisoners of war who come to prison camps may be used for useful purposes
and paid some small amount. It is patterned after that.”173 The 1949 Geneva
Conventions generally are regarded as the core of international humanitarian
law, and the prisoners of war protections are no exception. This is evident in
the prison camp labor provisions, not only with regard to compensation for
labor performed but in Article 49, which explicitly states that prisoners of war
“may in no circumstances be compelled to work.”174 As such, the political
context that influenced the payment of detainee labor law appeared to be a
combination of security and humanitarian concerns.175
B. The Voluntary Work Program
Section 6(d) of the DOJ expenditure bill today is codified in the INA as 8

171. This period was short-lived, because soon after the INA was enacted in 1952,
immigration law adopted a presumption that noncitizens in deportation proceedings would
be paroled rather than detained. See Stumpf, supra note 37 (manuscript at 17) (citing
WILSHER, supra note 31, at 64).
172. Hearing on H.R. 4645 and S. 2864 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 31 (statement of George M. Miller, Assistant Chief of the
Accounts Branch, Department of Justice). The Geneva Convention was ratified on August
12, 1949, but the United States did not sign on until 1955. See e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 62, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S.
135
[hereinafter
Geneva
Convention],
available
at
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=742
14325D0325FE0C12563CD0051AF9E.
173. Id. In particular, Article 62 of the Convention provided that: “Prisoners of war
shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by the detaining authorities direct. The rate shall be
fixed by the said authorities, but shall at no time be less than one-fourth of one Swiss franc
for a full working day.” Geneva Convention, supra note 172.
174. Geneva
Convention,
supra
note
172,
art.
49,
available
at
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=517
042012F4D959CC12563CD0051AE8A.
175. See generally Chacón, supra note 38. Although beyond the scope of this Article,
the payment of detainee labor provision also came about during a time of feared labor
shortages. “In 1951, Congress passed Public Law 78, which gave the Bracero program [for
Mexican guest workers] a permanent statutory basis for the next 13 years. This extension
was enacted in response to political pressure from growers . . . [and to] growing fears of
labor shortages during the Korean War.” KOULISH, supra note 82, at 62-63.
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U.S.C. § 1555(d).176 The rate of pay for detainee labor remains a matter for
congressional action, and the last time Congress addressed the issue was in the
Appropriations Act of 1979, when it kept it at one dollar a day.177
1. Legal Analyses of Detainee Labor
The legality of immigrant detainee work came under scrutiny after the
enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which for
the first time made it unlawful for undocumented immigrants to work.178 This
analysis came from the former INS, in the form of a legal opinion issued by the
General Counsel’s Office. The opinion addressed the following question:
“Does work performed by alien detainees in a detention facility operated by or
contracted through the Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . subject the
Service to the employer sanctions provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act . . . ?”179
INS’s answer to this question was, “No.” To arrive at this answer, the
General Counsel’s Office placed immigrant detainee labor outside the scope of
IRCA employer sanctions by finding that there was no employee/employer
relationship between the detainee worker and INS or its contractors. The legal
opinion proffered the following reasoning: “Inmates may be required to
participate in an institutional work program, and for that participation receive
remuneration. Work performed is for the purpose of rehabilitation and
institutional maintenance, not compensation.”180
The INS General Counsel’s Office reasoning circumventing IRCA,
however, conflicts with the statute’s legislative history. The first tension is in
the opinion’s reasoning that detainees may be required to work. The House
Judiciary Committee hearing on the provision emphasized the voluntary nature
of detainee work, explicitly distinguishing the practice from the forced labor
law that was struck down in Wong Wing.181 The Geneva Convention upon
which the provision was modeled similarly expressly prohibits involuntary
labor.182 The other source of conflict between the INS’s legal opinion and the
statute’s legislative history is in downplaying the remunerative aspect of
detainee labor. Once again, the Committee hearing record makes clear that
Section 6(d) was meant to change the status quo, which was not paying

176.
177.
178.
179 .

S. REP. NO. 1258, at 2-3 (1950); see also 8 U.S.C. §1555(d).
Urbina, supra note 24; Kunichoff, supra note 136.
See supra note 73.
INS GEN. COUNSEL, THE APPLICABILITY OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS TO ALIEN
DETAINEES PERFORMING WORK IN INS DETENTION FACILITIES, Op. No. 92-8 (1992).
180. Id. (emphasis added) (“Therefore, an inmate who participates in a work program
in a state or federal facility is not doing so ‘for wages or other remuneration’ and is not
therefore an ‘employee’ as defined by [the corresponding regulation to IRCA].”).
181. See supra text accompanying note 45.
182. See supra text accompanying note 174.
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detainees for work performed.183 Moreover, the fact that the provision was
lifted from the language of the Geneva Convention demonstrates the
importance of the compensatory aspect of the legislation.184
The other standing analysis of the detainee labor statute is from the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which specifically addressed the rate of pay. In this
case, Guevara v. INS, the plaintiffs were former and current detainees who
conducted institutional work such as grounds maintenance, cooking, and
laundry.185 They alleged that the rate of one dollar a day at which they were
paid violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).186 In rejecting plaintiffs’
claim, the Fifth Circuit characterized detainees as outside the group of workers
Congress intended to protect under the FLSA: “The congressional motive for
enacting the FLSA . . . was to protect the ‘standard of living’ and ‘general wellbeing’ of the worker in American industry. Because they are detainees removed
from American industry, Plaintiffs are not within the group that Congress
sought to protect in enacting the FLSA.”187
The court further held that detainees do not fall under the definition of
government “employees” by finding that detainees are the same as inmates in
the criminal justice system, the latter of which courts have held are outside the
protection of the FLSA. 188 As discussed in Part III.B, however, there are
dispositive differences between detainees and criminal inmates that put into
question the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Guevara.
2. DHS Oversight of Detainee Labor
Within the DHS, ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations

183. See supra text accompanying note 159.
184. In an article in which ICE defended detainee paid labor, it failed to acknowledge

that there are both statutory and administrative guidelines underlying the practice, saying in a
statement that “there is no specific statute, regulation, or executive order authorizing the
program.” Susan Caroll, $1 a Day for Immigrants Illegal on Outside, Just Fine in Jail,
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 26, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houstontexas/article/1-a-day-for-immigrants-illegal-on-outside-just-1661907.php.
185. Guevara v. INS, 902 F.2d 394, 395 (5th Cir. 1990).
186 . Id. Plaintiffs also alleged that 8 U.S.C § 1555(d) makes an impermissible
distinction based on alienage without a compelling governmental purpose to justify this
classification. The court, however, found that because the statute is part of the government’s
overall power to regulate immigration, it is constitutional as “a valid exercise of the
congressional power to regulate the conduct of aliens.” Id. at 396-97.
187. Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
188. Id. (“These prior decisions . . . have recognized imprisoned individuals are not
covered under the FLSA because they do not fit the statutory definition of employee and
because the congressional intent of the FLSA was to protect the standard of living and
general well-being of the worker in American industry.”) The court looked to prison inmate
cases because it recognized that there were no other cases addressing specifically labor in the
context of immigration detention. Id.
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(DRO) oversees immigration detention operations. 189 It is governed by
detention standards, which were first issued in November of 2000. 190 The
detention standards address detainee labor by its institutional name—the
“Voluntary Work Program” (VWP).191 According to the standards, the VWP is
made available to detainees in all three types of detention facilities. 192
Information provided through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
filed by Professor Stevens shows that the majority of the facilities that engage
in paid immigrant labor are facilities contracted by ICE to for-profit
corporations.193
Categorized as “detainee services,” the VWP is described as giving
“detainees opportunities to work and earn money while confined.” 194 The
standards specifically provide that while detainees can volunteer for work
assignments, they cannot be required to work, except to do “personal
housekeeping.” 195 The standards also specify the limited rights afforded to
detainees under the VWP. As a general rule, detainees are not permitted to
work in excess of eight hours a day, forty hours a week. 196 There are
antidiscrimination prohibitions and a grievance process 197 and, “while not
legally required,” basic health and safety protections afforded to detainees who
work under the VWP.198 Information obtained by Professor Stevens’s FOIA,
however, suggests that there has been considerable leeway in the enforcement
of the limited rights laid out by the standards pertaining to the VWP.199

189 . Interior enforcement is distinct from Customs and Border Patrol, which is
responsible for enforcement at ports of entry and within 100 miles of the border. Authority of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agents: An Overview, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Feb.
23, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/authority-us-customs-and-borderprotection-agents-overview.
190. Sayed, supra note 84, at 1854 n.115.
191. INS, Voluntary Work Program, in DETENTION OPERATION MANUAL 1 (2000),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/work.pdf.
192. INS, Voluntary Work Program, in 2011 OPERATIONS MANUAL ICE
PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 382 [hereinafter WORK PROGRAM
STANDARDS],
available
at
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionstandards/2011/voluntary_work_program.pdf.
193. Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA officer at ICE, to Jacqueline
Stevens, Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University (Sept. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter
Stevens
FOIA],
available
at
http://www.governmentillegals.org/2011FOIA13921SlaveLabor.pdf.
194. WORK PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 192. Note that this seems to be in
conflict with the agency’s earlier legal opinion concerning IRCA. See supra text
accompanying note 180.
195. Personal housekeeping includes tasks relating to the upkeep of their immediate
living area such as “making their bunk beds daily, stacking loose papers, keeping the floor
free of debris and dividers free of clutter.” Id. at 383-84.
196. Id. at 385.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 382.
199. Stevens FOIA, supra note 193.
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C. Problems Associated with the Voluntary Work Program
“Zamora” was a lawful permanent resident when ICE detained him after a
shoplifting conviction. 200 He was being held at a contracted, privately run
immigration detention facility while awaiting his immigration court hearing,
and was happy to have a job assembling arrival packages for new detainees to
help him pass the time. Zamora considered this job to be better than others
available to detainees, because it allowed him to be in close proximity to the
facility’s administrators with whom he was able to develop good relationships.
Moreover, he reported that the pay of ninety cents a day was better than what
he was paid in his last assignment of doing laundry. While he was grateful for
the work, the pay did not go very far, especially in relation to the cost of items
in the prison’s commissary: the envelope he purchased to mail a letter to the
law clinic representing him cost him one dollar—ten cents more than his oneday earnings. Also, about one month before his immigration court hearing,
Zamora was suddenly pulled from his job based on a vague assertion of
“security changes” made in the facility. Zamora told his student attorneys that
the loss of work made him more desperate than ever to be released from
detention.
Zamora’s experience highlights both the complexities and problems with
paid detainee work. The complexities include the fact that many detainees such
as Zamora welcome the opportunity to work as a way to endure the stress and
boredom of incarceration. Zamora’s story also demonstrates that performing
work can position detainees favorably vis-à-vis guards and other personnel in
the facility. The first problem is clearly the rate of pay, especially in relation to
the hyperinflated prices in prison and detention commissaries. The other set of
problems involve potential abuses related to work opportunities and in some
cases, work requirements. These and other reported issues will be addressed
below.
As discussed, the statutory minimum pay for detainee labor is one dollar a
day, and has been since 1950 when the law was enacted. Zamora does not
know why he was paid less than the one-dollar wage, but he is not alone: about
five percent of detainees in the aggregate are not paid for their labor at all,
which is how a county in Ohio “saved at least $200,000 to $300,000 a year by
relying on about 40 detainees each month for janitorial work.”201 In such cases,
detainee workers sometimes are referred to as “volunteers,” as the ACLU of
Georgia reported regarding the VWP at the Irwin County Detention Center:
The work program at Irwin is not compensated. The “volunteers,” as the
detainees are called, have duties that range from cleaning and kitchen duty to
200. This narrative involves a case that is part of the Washington College of Law
Immigrant Justice Clinic’s active docket. The facts relayed were obtained during the course
of representation. “Zamora” is not the detainee’s actual name; the detainee’s name has been
altered to protect his identity given that the detainee’s case is pending.
201. Urbina, supra note 24.
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distributing clothing to new arrivals. Detainee interviews revealed that the
work of the volunteers is poorly monitored at times, which has resulted in
reports of abuse and discrimination dealt out to other detainees.202

Some detainees describe being paid in junk food in lieu of the dollar-a-day
wage. Karina Tamayo from the Northwest Detention Center received a
chocolate bar and chips for cleaning other cells and folding blankets for
incoming detainees.203 Tamayo said that while detainees would receive the
dollar wage for laundry shifts, other jobs were compensated with snack food.204
Other detainees who are given the dollar-a-day rate of pay report being paid in
“credits toward food, toiletries and phone calls.” 205 Such items often are
necessities that are not provided by the facility—for example, detainees in
Arizona’s Eloy Detention Center are only provided soap and must buy their
own shampoo. 206 Often goods sold by prisons and detention facilities are
offered at exorbitant prices, 207 which is why Professor Stevens posits that
detainees often participate in the VWP primarily “so that they can buy food and
hygiene products. If they don’t have relatives on the outside to pump up their
commissary accounts then they’ll buff floors.”208
In other reported cases, detainee labor is an alternative to punishment or
harsher treatment. For Marian Martins, a detainee held in Alabama’s Etowah
County Detention Center, “work had been her only ticket out of lockdown,
where she was placed when she arrived without ever being told why.” 209
Martins was compensated for her work, which included cooking and scrubbing

202. ACLU, supra note 120, at 87.
203. Audio tape: Interview of Karina Tamayo at Northwest Detention Center (Apr.

2013) (on file with author).
204. Id.
205. Urbina, supra note 24. Detainees with relatives out of state have reported having
to pay higher charges for phone calls. See ACLU, supra note 120, at 52. Moreover, the ICE
Detention Standards include providing reasonable telephone rates, but jails holding detainees
are not required to follow these standards. Leticia Miranda, Dialing with Dollars: How
County Jails Profit from Immigrant Detainees, NATION (May 15, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/179775/dialing-dollars-how-county-jails-profit-immigrantdetainees# (“About 50 percent of all immigrant detainees are held in county jails, according
to ICE, and many of these cash-strapped jails, like Plymouth County Detention Center, have
sought to raise revenue through contracts with phone companies that charge excessive rates
and kick back part of the profits. Immigrant detainees end up paying the same inflated
telephone rates charged to their citizen inmate counterparts . . . .”).
206. Nina Rabin, Unseen Prisoners: Women in Immigration Detention Facilities in
Arizona, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 695, 732 (2009).
207. See Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prisons, Sky-High Phone
Rates
and
Money
Transfer
Fees,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
26,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/business/in-prisons-sky-high-phone-rates-and-moneytransfer-fees.html?_r=0; Marisa Lagos, Mirkarimi Looks to Cut Costs Paid by Inmates,
Families, S.F. CHRON. (July 24, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Mirkarimilooks-to-cut-costs-paid-by-inmates-5642361.php.
208. Kunichoff, supra note 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Urbina, supra note 24.
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showers, with extra free time.210 Other detainees have reported being punished
for not participating in the VWP. Similar to Hassall Moses, the detainee from
Northwest Detention Center who was allegedly put in solitary confinement for
encouraging a work stoppage,211 a detainee in CCA’s Stewart Detention Center
in Georgia 212 reported that he was placed in segregation for a week for
declining to work and organizing a work strike.213
Another Stewart detainee, Eduardo Zuñiga, was injured while working in
the kitchen as he waited to be deported to Mexico:
[Zuñiga] tore ligaments in one of his knees after slipping on a newly mopped
floor, leaving him unable to walk without crutches. Despite doctors’ orders to
stay off the leg, Mr. Zuñiga said, the guards threatened him with solitary
confinement if he did not cover his shifts. Now back in Mexico . . . he must
walk with a leg brace.214

Yet another Stewart detainee reported that he “was threatened with
segregation if he refused to work less than eight hours a day,” and alleged that
this was “not atypical.”215 Such stories have compelled the ACLU to conclude
that, “[e]ven though the [VWP] is supposed to be voluntary, detainees’
experiences are illustrative of its coercive nature.”216
Another issue reported by detainees is discrimination in the administration
of the VWP. One specific manner in which discrimination has manifested is in
who gets work. Detainees held at the Central Arizona Detention Center, for
example, have reported that there are limited jobs available to them relative to
prisoners: “Detainees were permitted to work jobs only within the pod, whereas
federal marshal prisoners could work in positions throughout the facility. Even
with this restriction, the few jobs that did not require leaving the pod were
frequently assigned to federal prisoners instead of the detainees.”217 At Eloy
Detention Center, also in Arizona, “[n]ew detainees, particularly those who are
not favored by the guards, which often correlated with being non-English
speaking and less acculturated to the United States, faced the most obstacles in

210. Id.
211. See supra Introduction. Other detainees from the Northwest Detention Center who

protested the rate of pay were allegedly retaliated against by not even getting a dollar a day:
“Detainees who have complained about doing janitorial work for only a dollar a day are now
being given a single candy bar or a bag of chips for volunteer work.” Blumenthal, supra note
2.
212. Stewart is the largest immigration detention facility in the country. DET. WATCH
NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE: STEWART DETENTION CENTER GEORGIA 1, available at
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/ExposeClose/
Expose-Stewart11-15.pdf.
213. See ACLU, supra note 120, at 57.
214. Urbina, supra note 24.
215. ACLU, supra note 120, at 57.
216. Id.
217. Rabin, supra note 206, at 733-34.
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securing a job.”218
III. DETAINEE LABOR AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The range of problems associated with the Voluntary Work Program calls
for an array of solutions, some of which are outlined in the Conclusion. This
Part will address the core constitutional concern associated with the VWP,
which turns on whether the work performed by detainees is in fact voluntary.
Specific detainees’ experiences related to the VWP discussed above that could
constitute forced detainee labor include being placed in solitary confinement
and otherwise being punished for not wanting to work, refusing to work more
than eight hours a day, and calling for a work strike. This Part explores how
cases of involuntary detainee labor are a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude. Courts have cited the
Exception Clause provided within the constitutional provision to uphold forced
labor in the context of the criminal justice system. As discussed below, this
exception is not applicable to the civil system of immigration detention in
which the VWP operates.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment and Its Exception Clause
The Thirteenth Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States . . . . Congress shall have
the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”219 Adopted on
December 6, 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment came on the heels of the
Emancipation Declaration to place “abolition on a broader and more secure
constitutional foundation” than what was provided by the Declaration.220 The
first clause prohibits outright slavery and involuntary servitude, which relate to
specific acts whose meanings have evolved over time.221 The second clause of
the Amendment confers upon Congress the power to prohibit conduct or laws
that subject individuals to degradation similar to that imposed by slavery, i.e.
“badges of slavery” or “badges of servitude.”222 The Thirteenth Amendment is
the only constitutional provision currently in effect that can be applied to
private persons or entities.223

218. Id. at 733.
219. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1-2.
220. George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment,

94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2008).
221. See infra Part III.B.1.
222. Lauren Kares, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of
a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 376-77 (1995).
223. James Gray Pope, What’s Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why
Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189, 189 (2011) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment stands out
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Litigation challenging the terms and conditions of prison labor generally
has been unsuccessful in large part due to the “except as a punishment for
crime” clause provided by the constitutional provision.224 Some have made the
argument that the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception clause should be limited
to prisoners who have been sentenced specifically to work as their
punishment.225 The plaintiff in Smith v. Dretke, for example, claimed that the
Texas Department of Corrections violated the Thirteenth Amendment by
forcing him to perform work in prison despite the fact that his sentence did not
call for such labor.226 The court, however, found that Smith did not have to be
sentenced to hard labor in order to be forced to work, and dismissed the suit as
frivolous.227
Another argument advanced to challenge prison labor under the Thirteenth
Amendment is that inmate labor in the context of for-profit prisons for little to
no pay should constitute prohibited involuntary servitude. 228 Before the
enactment of the Prison Industries Act in 1995, “prison labor for the private
sector was legally barred for years, to avoid unfair competition with private
companies.” 229 Criminal justice expert Ira Robbins, however, has stated,
as the sole rights guarantee that protects not only against government, but also against
private concentrations of power . . . .”); Rutherglen, supra note 220, at 1370 (“[A] ‘private
action’ interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be viewed as a limitation upon its
scope, since the Amendment applies to both state and private action . . . . With the repeal of
the Eighteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment stands alone among provisions of
the Constitution in having such expansive coverage.”).
224. See, e.g., Villareal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 206 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the Thirteenth Amendment limits prisoners’ rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Northrop v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:08-cv-0746, 2008 WL 5047792 (M.D. Pa. Nov.
24, 2008) (noting an earlier holding by the District Court that the Thirteenth Amendment
does not apply to plaintiff’s forced labor claim because he is being “held to answer for a
violation of a penal statute.”); Wilkinson v. McManus, 216 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. Sup. Ct.
1974) (holding the exception clause to find that plaintiff’s constitutional claims as to the
prison labor program generally and the amount of pay specifically have no merit); Kamal
Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause and Sexual
Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 609 (2008) (“The punishment clause appears to be aimed at
an important concern . . . . The Thirteenth Amendment, after all, sought to root out the evils
of antebellum slavery not the harshness of prison life.”).
225. See, e.g., Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the
Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 399400 (2009) (“[T]he modem doctrine of prison deference presents a comparably formidable
obstacle to the adoption of an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ‘punishment for
crime’ exception that limits it to those inmates who are compelled to work as punishment;
that is, to the extent they are so sentenced by a judge or jury.”).
226. 157 F. App’x 747, 747 (5th Cir. 2005).
227. Id. at 748.
228. See, e.g., Ryan S. Marion, Prisoners For Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment
Case Against State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 214 (2009)
(“By doing such work in the private context, however, prisoners directly contribute to the
profit-making function of the corporation. At the very least, therefore, inmate labor in private
prisons constitutes ‘involuntary servitude.’”).
229. Mike Elk & Bob Sloan, The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor, NATION

38

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[XI:1

“[O]nce a prisoner is convicted, it appears that the ‘convict labor exception’
applies without regard to the type of facility in which the confinement shall
take place, whether public or private.”230 In the context of the criminal justice
system, the Thirteenth Amendment has been generally interpreted to contain “a
prisoner exception clause.” 231 In addition to the plain language of the
Amendment, some have posited that this exception is indicative of the notion
that labor in the penal context is nonmarket work.232
B. The Thirteenth Amendment in the Context of Immigration Detention
As outlined above, inmates in the criminal justice system have not
successfully asserted their Thirteenth Amendment right against forced prison
labor. This Subpart explores how custodial labor in the context of the
immigration system warrants a different outcome. The broad argument is that
the “punishment for crime” exception of the Thirteenth Amendment does not
apply to immigration detention, because detention is not punishment, and
immigration violations for which detainees are held are not crimes.233 Building
on this argument, the following discussion will outline how the overall goals of
prison labor do not, for the most part, apply to immigration detention. In doing
so, it will examine the treatment of prison labor in the context of pretrial
criminal detention, contending that immigration detention is at least analogous
to the pretrial setting.
The distinction between the criminal justice and immigration systems,
namely that the latter is civil, means that there is a normative difference
between prison and detainee labor. From the vantage of both the offender and
society, the overarching objectives of prison labor are punitive, rehabilitative,
and restorative.234 Institutionally, the goals are administrative, i.e. efficiency

(Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/162478/hidden-history-alec-and-prisonlabor.
230. Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
531, 606 (1989).
231. Vanskike v. Peters, 74 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The Thirteenth Amendment
excludes convicted criminals from the prohibition of involuntary servitude . . . .”); Jobson v.
Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[T]hose in control of institutions for the mentally
retarded may subject inmates to a wide variety of programs with both therapeutic and cost
saving purposes without violating the Thirteenth Amendment.”); Ghali, supra note 224, at
609.
232. See, e.g., Zatz, supra note 144, at 897-903 (discussing the distinction between
market and nonmarket labor in employment law, and whether the nonmarket nature of prison
labor is relevant).
233. See Donald Hancock, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Juvenile Justice System,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 614, 616 (1992) (making an analogous argument in the
context of the juvenile justice system that “[b]ecause juvenile court findings are distinct from
criminal convictions, juvenile court dispositions which include involuntary servitude may
not be exempt under the Thirteenth Amendment”).
234. Timothy J. Flanagan, Prison Labor and Industry, in THE AMERICAN PRISON:
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and reducing idleness, and financial, i.e. lowering the cost of operating jails and
prisons. 235 Immigration detainee labor may share the institutional goals of
prison labor,236 especially in the context of the detention system’s current scope
and size, although one can question as a moral matter whether it should. But
this is where the overlap ends. Unlike prison labor, detainee labor must be
voluntary, as early case law, legislative history, and the programmatic name
associated with the practice—tellingly categorized under “detainee services” in
ICE’s detention standards—make clear.237 The individual and societal goals of
prison labor do not fit into the civil context of immigration detention.
Since most detainees are awaiting their immigration hearings, the
distinction made by prison labor jurisprudence between pretrial and
postconviction incarceration is instructive in further fleshing out the difference
between custodial labor in the criminal justice and immigration detention
contexts. 238 This distinction begins with the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s exception clause, namely that involuntary servitude may exist
“as a punishment for crime” of which a person has been “duly convicted.”239
Individuals incarcerated pretrial have not been convicted, and as such are
protected against conditions that constitute punishment. 240 Following this
distinction, courts have established there is no rehabilitative purpose for pretrial
detention.241
In McGarry v. Pallito, the Second Circuit cited the non-rehabilitative
function of pretrial detention to uphold a prisoner’s Thirteenth Amendment
claim against forced labor.242 Finbar McGarry was a pretrial detainee at a
Vermont correctional facility where he was allegedly compelled to “work in the
prison laundry under the threat of physical restraint and legal process,” namely
administrative segregation and disciplinary write-ups.243
The district court dismissed McGarry’s Thirteenth Amendment claim
based on a finding that being forced to work in the prison laundry was “nothing
like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the] Amendment.”244 The
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Thirteenth Amendment “intended to
prohibit all forms of involuntary labor, not solely to abolish chattel slavery,”
ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND POLICY 137 (Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds.,
1989); Lisa C. Phelan, Making Prisons Work, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1747, 1749-51 (1997).
235. Flanagan, supra note 233, at 137.
236. For example, the legislative history of immigration detainee labor mentions the
goal of maintaining order in detention facilities. See supra text accompanying note 155.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
238 . Those who are not awaiting hearings are waiting for ICE to execute their
deportation, which is also not a conviction.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
240. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
241. McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505, 513 (2d Cir. 2012).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 509.
244. Id. at 510 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and that the Amendment does not exempt pretrial detainees.245
Although immigration detention is a civil system, it has also been
compared to criminal pretrial detention. 246 Addressing the rights of ICE
detainees, the Ninth Circuit held that “conditions of confinement for civil
detainees must be superior not only to convicted prisoners, but also to pre-trial
criminal detainees.”247 Despite this seemingly uncontroversial legal distinction,
forced labor in the context of immigration detention as a violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment is not a settled principle. In fact, the Fifth Circuit in
Channer v. Hall, the only case that has addressed the subject, rejected this
supposition.248 Claudious Channer claimed that he was subject to involuntary
servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment as an immigration detainee
compelled to work in the Food Services Department of Oakdale Federal
Correctional Institution.249 The Court found that, even assuming that he was
compelled to work through the threat of solitary confinement, Channer’s
Thirteenth Amendment right was not violated.250 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit
relied upon a characterization of Channer’s work as the performance of
“housekeeping tasks,” which the Indiana Supreme Court categorized as labor
that fit within the “civic duty” exception of the Thirteenth Amendment.251 The
court went on to hold that “the federal government is entitled to require a
communal contribution by an INS detainee in the form of housekeeping tasks,
and that Channer’s kitchen service, for which he was paid, did not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude.”252
It is significant that the Channer decision predates ICE’s detention
standards, the latter of which was first issued in 2000.253 These standards make
clear that detainees cannot be required to work,254 and while they state that the
performance of “personal housekeeping” is an exception to the voluntary work
245. Id. In doing so, the Court acknowledged, “it is clearly established that a state may
not ‘rehabilitate’ pretrial detainees.” Id. at 513.
246. See, e.g., Clay McCaslin, “My Jailor is My Judge”: Kestutis Zadvydas and the
Indefinite Imprisonment of Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L. REV. 193, 224
(2000).
247. SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAWETZ, ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 2 (2007) (citing Jones v. Blanas, 393
F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 820 (2005)), available at
www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/unsr_briefing_materials.pdf.
248. Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1997).
249. Id. at 215.
250. Id. at 218. The claim therefore satisfied the standard set in a seminal Thirteenth
Amendment case, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), in which the Supreme
Court held that for involuntary servitude to exist, there must be physical or legal coercion.
Id. at 217.
251. Id. at 218-19. In doing so, the court noted that such tasks have been upheld in the
context of mental institutions. Id.
252. Id. at 219.
253. Sayed, supra note 84, at 1854 n.115.
254. See WORK PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 192, at 382.
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rule, the definition provided does not encompass the type of work at issue in
Channer. 255 ICE’s own guidelines regarding the Voluntary Work Program,
therefore, are in contravention to the Fifth Circuit’s preceding, almost twodecades-old decision on the subject. The McGarry decision upholding
Thirteenth Amendment rights in the pretrial criminal detention context should
further weigh against adherence to the Channer holding.
1. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Application to Immigrant Detainee Labor
It is relatively noncontroversial that the scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment extends beyond the physical acts of slavery imposed on African
Americans. The Amendment’s broad scope was first asserted in its legislative
history by Senator Lyman Trumbull’s “badges and incidents of slavery”
discussion.256 Congress thereafter invoked the power conferred by this second
clause to designate several southern states’ Black Codes as badges of slavery.257
Modern-day examples include discrimination in the making or enforcement of
contracts and in the sale or lease of housing. Generally, “[t]he meaning of the
Thirteenth Amendment has diverged widely at different moments in history—
emphasizing the right to contract during the Lochner era, New Deal labor and
economic rights in the 1930s and 1940s, and desegregation and
antidiscrimination during the civil rights era of the 1960s.”258
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, soon after the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, acknowledged its applicability to noncitizens. In The
Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Miller stated that the constitutional provision
does not only apply to slavery against African Americans, but also to “Mexican
peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system.”259 In fact, “[t]he language of the

255. Channer, 112 F.3d at 219; WORK PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 192, at 382.
256. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968); see The Slaughter-

House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 92 (1872); see also William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth
Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 8286 (2004) (arguing that giving only Congress power to address badges of slavery is
inconsistent with the Thirteenth Amendment’s legislative history and recent Supreme Court
precedent); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese
Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and
Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 73-74 (1996) (outlining a broad view of Thirteenth
Amendment’s scope). But see Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21
RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 388 (1967) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment was only
intended to bring about the emancipation of African Americans); Alexander Tsesis,
Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337, 1341 (2009) (citing The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 11, 19 (1883), where the Court referred to the Thirteenth
Amendment as “simply abolish[ing] slavery”).
257. Kares, supra note 222, at 376-77.
258. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment in Historical Perspective, 11 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1451, 1452 (2009).
259. Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of ‘universal civil and political
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Thirteenth Amendment has never been limited to the concept of citizenship,
and consequently, this provision has always applied to noncitizens as well as
citizens.” 260 The Valmonte court, however, has limited the Amendment’s
applicability to prohibiting the forced service of one to another.261 Today, the
Thirteenth Amendment has been invoked to protect the rights of immigrant
workers, including in the context of guest worker programs and domestic
workers. 262 In this landscape, the Thirteenth Amendment stands out as a
potentially valuable tool to protect against forced immigrant detainee labor.
CONCLUSION: CHIPPING AWAY AT PUNITIVE IMMIGRATION DETENTION
As discussed in the previous Part, involuntary detainee labor should be
prohibited as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery and
involuntary servitude. The constitutionality of involuntary labor in immigration
detention, however, is not the only concern related to the practice. As outlined
in Part II.B.2, the management of immigration detention is plagued by lack of
meaningful enforcement and oversight. This is particularly worrisome given
that ICE contracts out about half of the facilities in the vast detention system to
for-profit prison companies. Early in its first term the Obama administration
acknowledged the need to improve agency oversight over immigration
detention.263 It even announced an intention to build a “truly civil” system,
recognizing that detention has veered considerably into the realm of the

freedom’ applies to citizens from any race or class who have been branded with a badge of
inferiority or involuntary servitude.”); Torok, supra note 256, at 72 (“The [Thirteenth]
Amendment relates to Chinese immigrants because ‘coolieism’ was often viewed as a
species of slavery.”); Tsesis, supra note 256, at 1340 (citing The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872)).
260. Torok, supra note 256, at 72.
261 . Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying a Thirteenth
Amendment cause of action to non-citizen nationals of U.S. territories).
262. Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day Involuntary
Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Trafficking, 38 U.
TOL. L. REV. 941 (2007); Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the
Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923
(2007); Maria L. Ontiveros & Joshua R. Drexler, The Thirteenth Amendment and Access to
Education for Children of Undocumented Workers: A New Look at Plyler v. Doe, 42 U.S.F.
L. REV. 1045 (2008) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment should apply to migrant
workers’ children); Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Abusive Mail-Order Bride Marriage and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2000). See generally Alexander Tsesis, Into
the Light of Day: Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to Contemporary Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2012) (citing Professor Richard Delgado’s call for a more
active application of non-Thirteenth Amendment remedies for non-African Americans, such
as Native Americans and Latinos).
263. Spencer S. Hsu, ICE to Strengthen Oversight of Immigrant Detention, WASH.
POST
(Aug.
7,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/06/AR2009080601543.html.
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punitive, but it has failed to make much progress on fulfilling this promise.264
The creation of a system of accountability for immigration detention would
help ensure that the Voluntary Work Program is not misused to the detriment of
detainees.
Another considerable concern related to detainee labor is the rate of pay.
Some have argued that the Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage
protection should be extended to detainee labor.265 Professor Stevens contends
that the FLSA should apply to the modern immigration detention system
regardless of historical context:
The history suggests that whatever Congress in 1950 may have intended for
the wages paid to aliens held under immigration laws, it has little bearing on
the program in place today. The worker/employer relation in today’s ICE
facilities is much closer to the factors contemplated in the FLSA than it is to
the economics and management of the multi-faceted alien internment, prisoner
of war, and immigrant detention laws and policies in the 1940s.266

Even assuming arguendo that detainee labor is not covered by the FLSA,
the paltry sanctioned rate of one dollar a day—a rate that has not changed since
1950—is ripe for revision. The statute requires that the rate of pay be reviewed
“from time to time” through Congress’s appropriations process,267 but the last
time this occurred was in 1979. In addition to a potential violation of the letter
of the law, there is a moral concern: the rate of pay under the Voluntary Work
Program, which in the words of Hassall Moses is akin to “modern-day
slavery,”268 is now a cornerstone for the profits made by companies running the
facilities. Put another way, “[t]he financial necessity for privately run ICE
detention facilities to have available detainee labor has reportedly created
perverse incentives to coerce detainees into the VWP.”269
In arguing for a critical examination of “voluntary” immigrant detainee
labor, this Article joins those calling for legal and policy reforms to the
immigration enforcement system “with the goals of scaling back or altering the
nature of detention to conform to its status as a civil, rather than penal,

264. Susan Carroll, ICE Paints Bleak Picture of Detention System, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct.
10, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/ICE-paints-bleak-picture-of-itsdetention-system-2209428.php.
265. See Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of Immigration
Jail Work Programs—A History and Legal Analysis, 1943-Present 14-15 (May 15, 2014)
(working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2434006.
266. Id. at 95. Professor Stevens filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against
ICE regarding the Voluntary Work Program contending, inter alia, that ICE is in violation of
Department of Treasury rules and the separation of powers based on Congress’s failure to
address the rate of pay issue through its appropriations process. Complaint at 4, Stevens v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:14-cv-03305 (N.D.Ill. May 6, 2014).
267. 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d) (2013).
268. Moses, supra note 6.
269. Complaint, supra note 266, at 5.
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institution.”270 Detainee labor, and the significant problems and moral questions
associated with it, is another attribute of a “crimmigration” system that has
gone too far. At the heart of the matter is a bloated detention system, unmoored
from its original rationale, which is operating without meaningful checks and
balances within a broken immigration system. 271 Reforming the Voluntary
Work Program would constitute one way to scale back what has become an
unjustifiably punitive institution.

270. Das, supra note 16, at 138.
271. “[T]he civil nature of immigration enforcement suggests, rather than merely

different conditions of detention, that the overall system should employ detention less.”
Mark Noferi, New ABA Civil Immigration Detention Standards: Does “Civil” Mean Better
Detention
or
Less
Detention?,
CRIMMIGRATION
(Aug.
28,
2012),
http://crimmigration.com/2012/08/28/new-aba-civil-immigration-detention-standards-doescivil-mean-better-detention-or-less-detention/.

